MEMORIES: MY SEVENTY-TWO YEARS IN THE ROMANTIC
COUNTY
OF YUBA CALIFORNIA
BY W. T. Ellis
with an introduction by Richard Belcher
EUGENE: THE UNIVERSITY OF OREGON
PRINTED BY JOHN HENRY NASH
1939
Copyright, 1939, by W. T. Ellis, Marysville
DEDICATED TO MY OLD HOME TOWN MARYSVILLE
CHAPTER LXXXI
Zero Reading on D Street Gauge
IN 1872 a wooden bridge was constructed across the Yuba River at the foot of D
Street. The following year, some one decided that there should be a gauge
erected on the down stream side of this bridge and on March 22, 1873, this gauge
was placed in position and zero on the gauge was the surface of the water in the
river that day. Just why this zero was not placed at the then bottom of the
river as no doubt in the later summer months of that year, the river no doubt
got lower and the surface of the water was presumably below the zero reading, no
one seems to know. In any event, zero is without question the low water reading
of that date when it was installed.
I have at various times, had this zero “tied in” with other datum planes and
same are as follows:
Zero was the low water mark of the Yuba River on March 22, 1873.
Zero reads 55.00 on Western Pacific Railroad datum.
Zero reads 53.39 on Southern Pacific Railroad datum.
Zero reads 46.83 on U.S. Geological Survey datum.
Zero reads 51.67 on State Engineering Department datum.
Zero reach 51.83 on California Debris Commission datum for Yuba River.
Zero reads 50.43 on California Debris Commission datum for all other rivers.
CHAPTER LXXXII
Gauges on Marysville Levee System
OUTSIDE RIVER GAUGES
Goodyear's Bar, 4 miles from Yuba River. Downieville.
Low water reading 2.9 feet
High water reading 17.0 feet
Colgate Power House. Yuba River.
Low water reading --2.0 feet
High water reading 22.0 feet
Los Plumas Power House. Feather River.
Low water reading 455.0 feet
High water reading 481.0 feet
Oroville, on Bridge. Feather River. U.W.S.B.
Low water reading
High water reading 26.3 feet
Because the Yuba River at the D Street bridge has scoured about 13 feet since
1905, they believe that this will result in a lower flood plane, but such is not
the case under the new existing conditions. For example, the flood of 1907
registered 22 feet 3 inches at D Street (when scour had just commenced) while in
1937 the flood, registered 25 feet 8 inches (when there had been a 13-foot
scour).
The scouring of the river bed DOES however expedite the lowering of the flood
plane peak. For example, in the 1907 flood, it took eleven days to drop to the
13-foot mark (level with D Street) while in 1937 it took only five days to drop
to this 13-foot mark.
CHAPTER LXXXIII
Water Pressure
EVERY time a flood occurs, I am asked about the security of the levees; is there
any danger of them breaking from the pressure of the water against them,
particularly at some places where the flood waters extend for several miles
against the levees, the general opinion being that the less the expanse of water
against the levee, the less the pressure. This idea is of course incorrect, the
pressure against the levees, say between Marysville and Yuba City, where the
river is comparatively narrow, is just the same as the pressure against our
north levee, where the flood waters extend a distance of several miles. The
pressure of water against the levees is determined by multiplying the depth of
the water by 62.5. For example; if there is say, ten feet of depth of water
against a levee, the pressure against every square foot of the levee at the
first top one foot of water is 62.5 pounds and at the base of the levee, where
the water is ten feet deep, then the pressure against every square foot of the
levee's base is 625 pounds; this is what is called the “hydrostatic paradox.”
Now let us assume we have a levee, say 15 feet high, with a crown width of eight
feet, with side slopes of 3 feet to 1 foot; this would make the base of the
levee 98 feet thick. If the levee is constructed of heavy clay material (such as
our levees are), this material will weigh about 100 pounds to a cubic foot, so
if the levee is 98 feet thick at the base, then the weight of the levee material
behind every square foot at the base would be 9800 pounds and the pressure of
the water, if it was ten feet deep, would be 650 pounds, pressing against the
9800 pounds of levee material. This is what is called the “factor of safety” and
in the above case, then the weight of the levee material is about fifteen times
greater than the water pressure against it.
In our levee system at flood times, rarely have the flood waters remained
against the levees more than a few days, but in the delta region on the lower
rivers, the flood waters remain against the levees for many weeks and the
material is mostly “peat” soil with poor foundations for the levees. The
constant pressure of the water results in the water seeping into the levee
material and softening the levee, and as a result, they have to have much
greater thickness to their levees than we do at Marysville, where, as previously
stated, the earth used in the levees is mostly heavy clay and the levees are
situated on practically hard pan ground.
Even under these conditions, seepage occurs at various places, this seepage
almost invariably being through the ground and under the base of the levee; this
seepage water will show up perhaps close to the levee base; if such seepage is
perfectly clear water, there is no occasion for alarm, but, if discolored muddy
water is observed, that is a different matter and requires immediate
investigation and attention.
CHAPTER LXXXIV
Agitation for New Levee Commissioners
AFTER the 1904 and 1907 floods when so much money was being expended on the
City's levee system, very largely under my plans and direct supervision, some
citizens contended that both John C. White and W. T. Ellis Sr., were getting too
old for the job; that they had performed their duties for many years, that the
actual work was devolving on me and that it would be best to have two new and
younger men on the Commission, I to be retained. This agitation was started by
certain parties, with whom I had “crossed swords” at various times and, to me,
it was quite obvious that the intention was to place me as a “minority member”
of the Commission but at the same time, letting the public believe that they
were very favorable to myself.
As soon as this proposal was made public, I immediately came out in the
newspapers with an announcement (generally referred to as an ultimatum), that
the three incumbent Levee Commissioners would again be candidates for the office
and three opponents be placed in nomination; that if, as a result of the
election, I should be elected and John C. White and W. T. Ellis Sr., were
defeated, that I would decline to qualify for the position to which I had been
elected. (This was in February 1908.) This resulted in there being six
candidates for Levee Commissioners with three to be elected.
Great interest was taken by the public, it being the first time there had ever
been a “scrap” for the position of Levee Commissioner, a position which paid no
salaries or expenses, it being the idea in the original Act, that no one would
aspire to the position except those who had the interests of the City and the
safe maintenance of its levee at heart.
The election resulted in the three incumbent members being again elected, my
father and myself, by safe majorities, but John C. White was elected by the
close margin of only four votes over Mr. H. H. Dunning. This resulted in a
contest commenced in the Court by Mr. Dunning, he claiming that the election
officers had been careless in the counting, lax in their duties, etc. Mr.
Dunning no doubt confident, that if he could win out over Mr. White, I would
keep my word and refuse to act, in which case, my father would do likewise with
the result that there would be an entirely new Board of Commissioners.
Mr. Dunning lost his contest, Mr. White was declared elected and the old Board
proceeded to carry out the plans, which had already been formulated, for more
levee work. There has never been a “contest” for the position of Levee
Commissioner since.
CHAPTER LXXXV
Agitation to Widen the River at the D Street Bridge and Replace with a New
Bridge at Simpson Lane
AS A RESULT of the floods of 1904, 1907 and 1909 coming so close together,
each succeeding flood being higher than the preceding one and the bed of the
Yuba River having been constantly raising for many years past, many citizens
became alarmed and came to the incorrect conclusion that the width of the Yuba
River at the D Street bridge was entirely too narrow, that the levee on the
south bank should be set back about a half mile to the high ground and that the
bridge across the river at the D Street bridge should be abandoned and that a
new bridge should be constructed between Marysville and the south side of the
river. This bridge was to follow the old Simpson Lane route, the terminal of the
bridge to be near the Dunning Ranch, (site of the old historic “Yuba Dam”).
Not only were there many citizens of both the City and County who seemed
favorable to the proposal, but the Mayor and Council and the Board of
Supervisors became impressed with the idea. I was convinced that it would be a
mistake and a costly error to carry out any such plan and immediately commenced
to protest and air my reasons for my objections. I was immediately accused of
objecting for selfish reasons; that I was objecting because the abandonment of
the D Street bridge and the construction of the new proposed bridge at Simpson
Lane would seriously and adversely affect the value of the Ellis Block on D
Street, only one half block distant from the D Street bridge. For an actual
fact, my father as well as Mr. White, the other two Levee Commissioners, while
they did not express themselves, were, I knew, in rather a receptive mood
towards the new proposal. I soon found out that I was about the only person in
Marysville making serious objections to the plan; I had no control over the
bridge or the levee on the south bank of the river and for the first time, I
even doubted my influence with the other two members of our Levee Commission.
The Board of Supervisors addressed a long letter to the Marysville Levee
Commission, setting forth their views and requesting a reply as to our point of
view. This was replied to at length and I had both letters printed in a four
page circular and circulated through the mails, for the public's information. I
followed this up with another four page circular giving a lot of facts and
figures endeavoring to demonstrate the mistake that would be made if the
proposed plan were carried out; I showed that the bridge at D Street was 2000
feet long but that if the Simpson Lane plan was carried out, it would require
several bridge openings as well as high earth embankments and that the total
length of these bridges and embankments would be 9365 feet long. I contended
that the proposed earth embankment for an elevated road, from the City levee on
A Street, for a distance of about 1500 feet, to connect with the first bridge
across the first river channel, would be at right angles to our levee and the
flood flow, would cause a dangerous “pocketing” of the flood waters against the
levee, making necessary the raising of the City levee at Yuba Square and some
distance easterly upstream. I also showed that the cost of the project would
entail an additional tax rate on the City of $1.45 for its share of the expense
and an additional tax rate of $1.25 on the County; that the construction of this
new route into Marysville and the abandonment of the D Street bridge, would be
an inconvenience, not only to the traffic passing through Marysville to
Sacramento but would also be an inconvenience to all the residents, directly
south of Marysville, who would have to travel several miles easterly, then about
two miles westerly to get into and out of town.
For about three months, there was a great deal of discussion and then an
alternate proposal was advanced by some citizens which they called the “Lose the
Yuba” project, which proposed that the Yuba River be entirely diverted from its
present channel, at and for several miles above and below Marysville, by
diverting the river, at the base of the foothills (where Hammonton is now
located) and have a new channel for the river, with new levees on both sides of
this channel, the new channel to run in a southwesterly direction to Plumas
Lake, thence into the Feather River. Mr. Fred H. Greely, I believe, originated
this plan and soon had many advocates and followers, particularly when it was
demonstrated that the distance would be about 16 miles, and the fall in that
distance was about 63 feet, or approximately four feet to the mile. This plan
soon afterwards was “forgotten” after I had estimates made of the cost of
diverting the river, of the cost of the two parallel levees, each some sixteen
miles in length, also the cost of the land which would have to be acquired and
paid for, for the rights of way for this new river channel and that most of
these land owners were really in favor of the plan but were raising objections
to enable them to “bolster up” their asking prices for such rights of way, when
condemnation proceedings were commenced. This resulted in the “Lose the Yuba”
project gradually “dying out” and then the public commenced to unite on the
original project. Finally, a mass meeting was called for by the Board of
Supervisors. I prepared a large map, on a large sheet of linen cloth, the map
being about five feet wide and sixteen feet long. This map showed Marysville and
the Yuba River, for several miles upstream and including the Feather River, down
stream to and including the narrow channel at Hock Farm. All levees were shown
in proper locations also various well known points of interest so that the
average layman, unfamiliar with the situation, could grasp the idea which we
were endeavoring to convey. The room was jammed full of interested citizens and
twice as many were on the outside unable to get in. As practically everyone in
the room was “for” the new project, I took up most of the time at the meeting
explaining my reasons for being “against” the project. I gave comparisons
between the discharge of the 1907 and 1909 floods, what had occurred during
those two floods and showed the places on the river channels where fills and
sand bars occurred where the width between levees was too great and where there
was a contrary condition where river widths were reasonable and proper; I
predicted that an additional width of about one-half mile at the D Street bridge
would still further encourage the filling of the river and that the present
width was ample and levee locations should be maintained as they now were. There
were several heated arguments and when the meeting adjourned, I felt satisfied
that I had convinced very few, if any, to my way of thinking. In desperation, I
took the matter up with the California Debris Commission and Captain Thomas H.
Jackson came to Marysville, at my request, and together we went over the whole
situation and finally, in a letter addressed to the Levee Commission, sustained
the arguments I had been making and disapproved of the setting back of the levee
on the south side of the river. Shortly after, the annual cross-section we had
made, disclosed for the first time, that while the three previous annual
cross-sections, had indicated no fill in the river, this last cross-section
showed a decided scour in the river. This fact and the report of Captain
Jackson, had the desired effect; the plan was abandoned; the south levee was
raised and then followed, some years later, the construction of the new concrete
bridge across the river, at D Street, to replace the old wooden structure.
CHAPTER LXXXVI
Why Our Present High Water Mark of 24 feet at Marysville will be Exceeded at
Some Future Flood
PREVIOUS to the consummation of the present flood control plan, and particularly
before the reclamation of some 60,000 acres of District No. 1500, generally
known as the Armour project in the Sutter Basin, the Yuba, Bear and Feather
rivers discharged their flood waters through Nelson Slough and other water ways
to the south, into the Sutter Basin, where these waters mingled with the excess
waters of the Sacramento River into this basin, making a flood width, west of
Nicolaus of about eleven miles. Then these waters would discharge, partly down
the Sacramento River itself, below Vernon, the greater portion discharging over
the natural south banks of the Sacramento River, for a long distance, in the
vicinity of Wild Irishman, Kenney and other bends of the river into the Yolo
Basin, as there were no artificial or natural obstructions to the flood waters
seeking escape into the Yolo Basin, thence south to Rio Vista and the bays
below. Before reclamation and the flood control plan was completed, these basins
contained the following approximate areas:
Colusa Basin 93,000 acres
Butte Basin 60,000 acres
Sutter Basin 116,000 acres
American Basin 53,400 acres
Sacramento Basin 32,300 acres
Yolo Basin 164,000 acres
Total Basin overflow area 518,700 acres
Since reclamation of the basins commenced and the Flood Control Plan has been
completed, the following approximate areas in those basins have been reclaimed
from storage of flood waters:
Colusa Basin 93,000 acres
Butte Basin 00 acres
Sutter Basin 91,995 acres
American Basin 53,400 acres
Sacramento Basin 32,300 acres
Yolo Basin 94,000 acres
Total area reclaimed 364,695 acres
Before all this reclamation occurred, the flood waters “hesitated” at these
various basins and filled each one up in turn “with a good big drink,” then
continued onward to discharge into the bays, thence to the sea. These immense
basins acted as “big breathing equalizing reservoirs.” Now that these basins are
reclaimed, the flood waters no longer have these basins at which to “hesitate”
and fill with “a good big drink,” so in place of these floods hereafter
traveling by “slow freight,” they now travel by “fast express”; in other words,
before reclamation of these basin areas, there were about 518,700 acres in these
“equalizing storage reservoirs” with a storage capacity of over four million
acre feet of water, while now, remain only some 154,005 acres for that purpose,
consisting largely of the by-pass areas. Before reclamation took place, these
basins would not drain dry, sometimes until late in July, large quantities of
the water no doubt seeping down into the ground and so maintaining a high
underground water table under the floor of a great portion of the Valley. But
now, with some 364,695 acres reclaimed, the flood waters passing through
by-passes, with deep borrow pits on each side, drainage is rapid and almost 100
per cent perfect and flood waters have no opportunity to seep down in the ground
and, in my opinion, this has been a large contributing factor in the rather
alarming lowering of the water table, necessitating deeper and deeper wells for
irrigation purposes.
Finally, when reclamation took place, the flood control plan with its by-passes
were established and in the meantime, the rivers had been previously filled with
debris, quite naturally higher flood planes in the rivers resulted. The world
war, which brought great demands for products of the soil at very high prices
for such products, no doubt resulted in a great deal of reclamation being
accomplished which otherwise, would have never been accomplished for many years
yet to come. This reclamation which was started in the first place with no
comprehensive plan for the needs of the rivers, was what made imperative the
flood control plan formulated by Captain Thomas H. Jackson of the California
Debris Commission. It was a good plan but in my humble opinion there were some
engineering errors made later on, when it was carried out, which, I firmly
believe, will be demonstrated some time when a maximum flood occurs on ALL the
rivers.
However, aside from the subject of this chapter, I am dwelling on “why our
present high water mark of 24 feet will be exceeded at some future flood,” and
the reasons for making that statement are as follows:
1. In a previous chapter, I have explained that the floods of the Bear, Yuba,
Feather and Sacramento rivers would mingle and make an overflow width, west of
Nicolaus of about eleven miles; the reclamation of the Sutter Basin has now
narrowed that width, just below Nicolaus, to seven thousand feet or less than
one and a half miles.
2. I have also explained in that same chapter how these combined flood waters
had a free and unobstructed discharge into the Yolo Basin; such is not now the
case as the flood entrance to the Yolo Basin is now regulated by a solid
concrete weir, known as the Fremont Weir, which is about 9200 feet long and cost
about one million dollars, the crest of this Weir being three and a half feet
higher than the bottom of the Sutter By-pass, twenty-four miles upstream at
which latter point, the Tisdale By-pass discharges into the Sutter By-pass.
Theoretically, the length and height of this Fremont Weir is such that it will
not raise the flood plane over what previous flood planes have been before the
Sutter By-pass and Weir were constructed; I hesitate to concur with that
conclusion and as yet, there has not been a major flood on the four upper rivers
at the same time, since the by-pass and this Weir were constructed and only such
a flood will give the correct answer.
3. The third and major reason is, the closing off of the escape waters at
Hamilton Bend, about four miles down stream on the Feather River from Oroville
and where from time immemorial, such waters have been escaping at extreme flood
periods, in a westerly direction in the town of Biggs area. The flood control
plan, called for levees to be constructed near the westerly bank of the Feather
River, for a distance of about six miles but dredgers are now working there and
now have possibly seventy-five per cent of the escape waters shut off for the
next good flood and in due time, levees will be constructed for the remaining
distance which will probably not be dredged but leveed.
The last big flood we had on the Feather River was in 1928 (before any dredging
had commenced at Hamilton Bend and the escape waters did a large amount of
damage to a large territory of farming land, also to the town of Biggs, as well
as to the Southern Pacific and Sacramento Northern Railroads and to the canals
of the Sutter Butte Canal Company.
As soon as that flood had subsided, I made a trip of investigation and
ascertained that the flood waters had covered the State highway for a distance
of about four miles with varying depths from one to six feet. Being desirous to
have some estimate of what amount of water escaped in that manner, I immediately
engaged Mr. E. A. Bailey (former State Control Engineer) to make an examination
and survey; this he did and the final conclusion reached was that approximately
35,000 second feet of water had escaped in that flood and, by the way, this was
not a maximum flood on the Feather River, it having been twenty-two inches lower
at Oroville than it was in the 1907 flood and also did not have a long sustained
flood, as had been the 1907 flood. This is the reason why all the levees on the
Feather River have been raised during the last few years with State and Federal
funds in anticipation of higher water planes, than have been recorded in the
past.
4. For the three reasons given above, when a repetition of the discharge of the
1907 flood occurs on the Feather and Yuba Rivers, the present high water mark of
24 feet on the D Street gauge (and 24 feet 6 inches on our Feather River gauge)
will be exceeded. On the Feather River gauge it is expected the flood plane will
be raised an additional twenty inches. This is the theoretical assumption; as
usual, the river itself will eventually give the correct answer; personally I am
inclined to believe that a duplication of the 1907 flood discharge will exceed
those estimates. This matter of a higher flood plane between Marysville and Yuba
City should be a subject for serious consideration to those authorities having
bridges between the two towns; I have brought the matter to their attention but
as yet, without any results. When these two bridges at that location are
reconstructed, they should be raised and have not less than fifty foot width for
spans.
Being satisfied in my own mind that the closing off of the escape waters at
Hamilton Bend will result in a greater increase of the flood heights between
Marysville and Yuba City of 20 inches, I have, as fast as State and Federal
funds are available, been “slabbing” and raising our levees, from the Jewish
cemetery to K and 9th Streets and am planning on similar work from 9th and K
Streets to the west end of the 5th Street subway, also the south subway wall,
also easterly to the D Street bridge.
NOTE--Since the above was written, the flood of December 1937 has occurred and
my prediction of an additional flood height of the Feather River between
Marysville and Yuba City of possibly twenty inches has actually occurred, the
increased height, however, actually being twenty-four inches; this,
notwithstanding the fact that the Feather River at this flood was twelve feet
below highest water dam) at Los Plumas Power house above Oroville, and nine
inches below high water mark at Oroville. This apparent inconsistency can be
explained by the fact that at Los Plumas Power house, situated on the North fork
of the Feather River, the Lake Almanor Dam restrained considerable of the
discharge from that fork of the river, while the south and middle forks of the
river (down stream, from this (dam) did not have as large or as prolonged a
discharge, as in the 1907 flood, when record flood heights were established.
CHAPTER LXXXVII
Early Day Suggested Plans for Flood Control and First Reclamation Board Act
AS EARLY as 1878, C. E. Grunsky, Assistant State Engineer under State Engineer
William Ham Hall, commenced investigations and prepared plans for flood and
debris control in order to solve the vexed problems which finally resulted in
the State constructing brush and earth dams on the Yuba and Bear rivers but
which subsequent floods completely destroyed.
In 1880, a plan for a by-pass system was offered by Messrs. Hall, Alexander and
Mendell but nothing was done. This was followed by a similar, but amended, plan
by Messrs. Mawson and Grunsky in 1894; again nothing was done.
In 1904, Major Dabney, who had at that time had great success in flood control
projects in the Yazoo District, adjoining the Mississippi River in Louisiana,
was engaged to come to California and plan a flood control plan for the
Sacramento Valley. He also made investigations and finally presented what is
known as the Dabney Report. Major Dabney made no plans for by-passes, his
recommendations were to set the levees back a very considerable distance from
where they were located at or near the river banks, in an effort to give more
channel way at flood periods. As such a plan would necessitate the acquirement
of valuable properties, not only of lands but the improvements on same at an
enormous expense, along the river banks for great distances, the plan was not
adopted.
It was very fortunate indeed that none of these plans were ever carried out for
the reason that none of them took into consideration the volume of flood
discharge of which the rivers were capable and as demonstrated later on in the
flood of 1907; had they been carried out, they would have proved complete
failures.
I was personally acquainted with all of these engineers and when Major Dabney
was out here, I made it my business to get in touch with him and have him make
an inspection of our Marysville levees and pass his judgment on same. I
entertained him for a day here and upon his return to Louisiana, received a
letter from him thanking me for the courtesies shown him and paying a compliment
to our method of levee building, and particularly for the system of giving
proper channel capacity for flood waters on both the Yuba and Feather rivers
above Marysville, in marked contrast with the system prevailing on the
Sacramento River, where most all levees were at, or close to, the river banks.
It was later on that large capital commenced to be interested in reclaiming
large areas of the various tule basins and their proposed plans disclosed that
they were not taking any heed of the requirements of the rivers' channel
capacity at excessive flood periods. General Will S. Green, publisher of the
Colusa Sun, had long taken an interest in flood problems and he commenced to
advocate in his newspapers that all present and future reclamation districts be
turned into one great reclamation district, with one central control of
management and with absolute control as to where levees should be constructed in
the future. Believing in “Home Rule” in reclamation districts, I commenced to
oppose his plans, at the same time agreeing with him that proper consideration
must be given to the needs of the rivers at flood stages. I advocated separate
and distinct reclamation districts but that the location of any new levees
should be under the control of some State authority for necessary approval.
It was at this same time that Captain Thomas H. Jackson of the California Debris
Commission was quietly formulating his flood control plan for by-passes after
the disastrous experiences of the 1907 flood. I had become well acquainted with
the Captain we made a number of trips of investigation on the Yuba and Feather
Rivers and I felt highly complimented one day, when at his office, he
confidentially showed me the by-pass plan which he was working on. I was
immensely impressed with the plan and told him of the idea I had of having some
State control over new levees so that all new levees should conform with his
plan and called his attention to the fact that tentative reclamation plans were
already under way at various places which would interfere with his project; he
agreed, but said he had no authority to stop such proposed works. Captain
Jackson then finished and made public his by-pass plans for flood control in
1910. The West Sacramento Reclamation District plans were under way and their
plans proposed “stealing” a long stretch, about one mile in width of the lowest
portion of the trough of the Yolo Basin, just south of the Southern Pacific
trestle. I then went and called on Mr. Lilenthal, President of that proposed
reclamation and endeavored to dissuade him from extending his proposed
reclamation west levee out so far into the Yolo Basin, but without results. I
then took the matter up with Senator Boynton of Oroville and Assemblyman Hewitt
of Yuba City, Speaker of the House, and Congressman Kent and urged the necessity
of action and suggesting, that at the special session of the Legislature, which
Governor Johnson was about to call for action on other matters, that his call
include some recommendation for State control. At that same time, Congressman
Kent came to Marysville for a visit and I broached the subject to him and he
stated that he would go at once to Sacramento and see the Governor. He suggested
that I do likewise, which I did a few days afterward, but before doing so, I
called on Mr. E. A. Forbes, who was then proprietor of the Marysville Appeal and
presented my ideas and on November 10, 1911 he had inserted an article embodying
my views. A few days afterward, on November 18, 1911, I was in San Francisco to
meet Congressman Humphreys of Washington at a banquet tendered him at the Hotel
St. Francis; this was followed by a day trip up the river to Sacramento on the
Steamer Navajo to make an inspection of the Sacramento River; there were many
notables on board and I had an opportunity to urge my plan for some State
control, with the assistance of Congressman Kent, who was one of the party.
Governor Johnson issued a call for a special session of the Legislature on
November 18, 1911, and included in his call, his desire for some legislation for
a reclamation control body. Under date of November 23, 1911, Mr. Forbes' local
newspaper, The Appeal, had the following article; --
THANKS TO THE GOVERNOR
“In his call for a special session, the Governor has put Yuba County especially,
and the valley in general, under obligations by including in the subjects which
the Legislature may legislate upon, the two most important at this time for the
valley and this County.
“He has adopted the idea of our W. T. Ellis, Jr., to place the reclamation
districts under the control of some State body so that in the future they may
not conflict with the great idea of reclaiming the whole valley. Mr. Ellis'
views have already been fully set forth in these columns. His position as the
greatest expert in the matter in the valley leaves no doubt of their wisdom and
it is a subject of general gratification that the Governor has arranged to allow
them to be enacted into law at the special session. Yuba County and Marysville
is to be congratulated upon having such a valuable citizen as Mr. Ellis.”
On November 27, 1911, the Legislature convened; a Bill had been drawn up
creating a State Reclamation Board; the Bill was passed and was approved by
Governor Johnson on December 12, 1911.
About five months later, I received a letter from Governor Johnson to call and
see him on May 18, 1912; I did so and much to my surprise he handed me his
appointment of myself to be a member of the new State Reclamation Board and
informed me that the other two members were to be Mr. V. S. McClatchy of
Sacramento and Mr. Peter Cook of Rio Vista. Seven days later, (May 25, 1912) we
met and perfected organization, Mr. McClatchy being elected President and I was
elected Secretary. We were to serve without salary and pay our own expenses and
pioneer a thirty-three million dollar project; I did not realize at the time
what very interesting and “warm” sessions we were going to have for the next few
years. In 1913, the second Reclamation Board Act was adopted, increasing the
membership from three to seven, giving additional powers and, this time, making
an allowance to each member for expenses. This new Act also created the
Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District, comprising 1,726,553 acres of
which about 500,000 acres were in the San Joaquin Valley.
CHAPTER LXXXVIII
Seasonal Weather Variations and Rainfall Records
OFT times, after a series of wet winters or dry winters or perhaps a series of
hot summers or cool summers, various people will remark, “that the weather is
changing,” but such is not the case; it is simply that “history is repeating
itself,” changes in various cycles have occurred many times before, and actual
“changes in the weather” take many centuries to account for.
It is a well established fact that there have been no material climatic changes
in California for at least the past two hundred years. Since the discovery of
gold in California, in 1849, much data has been kept from which rainfall curves,
etc., may be constructed and which gives a complete history of weather
conditions which have existed in California since that date; but prior to 1849,
no known records had been kept and which could be available for a study of
weather conditions in previous periods.
It is a peculiar condition that although there is a sufficient water supply in
the State to meet its ultimate demands, the geographical distribution is very
unequal. In the extreme northwestern part of the State, the normal rainfall is
about 100 inches annually, while in the desert region, the normal in the
southwestern portion there is practically no rain, while in the southwestern
portion of the State, where such immense development has taken place, the
rainfall and water supply is in short supply. Investigations have disclosed that
37.6 per cent of the State's waters originate in the North Pacific Coast Basin
which contains only 1.9 per cent of the agricultural lands, whereas the South
Pacific Coast Basin (Los Angeles area), has only 1.4 per cent of the water of
the State with 10.00 per cent of the agricultural land and one-half the
population of the State. In the San Joaquin Valley, with 36.3 per cent of the
agricultural land, there is only 16.8 per cent of the water. We here in the
Sacramento Valley area are particularly favored with more than ample water
supply, in fact with a surplus when conservation plans are carried out in the
future.
The great development in the southeastern portion of the State, the demand for
more and more water, made necessary and possible the construction of the Boulder
Dam. Previous to that, however, while rainfall records were available for that
area since 1850, nothing was known of previous seasons' records except legends
passed down by the Indian inhabitants of years of excessive rains and other
years of severe drought, in addition to writings left by early explorers such as
Fremont, Dana and others.
Then occurred, what to me is quite a remarkable thing; some one conceived the
idea that some past history might be obtained from some of the old Mission
buildings from records which might have been left by the Padres when, in 1834,
the Mexican Government took from the Franciscan Padres control over the Indians
and the Mission lands, and the Missions were sold, after having been in
existence for the previous sixty-five years. Mr. H. B. Lynch, Consulting
Engineer of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California was, I
believe, the moving spirit in placing men to work who found in almost every one
of the old Missions, safely stored away when the Padres departed, a mass of
records which were highly instructive, enlightening and entertaining. The Padres
had plenty of time, they were prolific writers and kept records of almost their
daily doings and occurrences, weather conditions, etc., and from all the mass of
data, a complete history of climatic conditions was obtained since 1769, when
the Spanish Mission Fathers arrived in California. All this information was
published in an intensely interesting booklet in 1931. A portion of the
conclusions reached were that there had been no material change in the mean
climatic conditions of Southern California in the past 162 years. That as to
rainfall conditions, however, there had been both excess and deficiencies of
greater magnitude than any which have occurred in the past forty years. That the
deficiency in rainfall which lasted from about 1822 to 1832 was more severe than
has been any occurring since. In a letter by Fr. Sanches of San Gabriel Mission
to Fr. Lasuen, under date of April 26th, 1796, the former wrote: “In the year
[1795] preceding this, we saw ourselves compelled to send half of the neophytes
for some months into the mountains to search for food after the manner of the
savages, whilst we maintained those staying here on half rations and a little
milk, until the time of the wheat harvest.” There are many similar records of
great drought and at the same time, the contrary was also true, for in 1825, it
is recorded: “The rivers were so swollen that their banks and the adjoining
lands were greatly damaged.”
The season of 1840-41 was very dry and references appear in the records, for
example, “During the winter prior to our arrival in California, that is during
1840-41, there had been very little rain and drought ensued. But little was
raised in the Country; horses were thin and poor like most other horses in that
dry season.”
The above are accounts of Southern California, but General Bidwell who entered
the State in 1840, locating at Chico, wrote in his old diary, “THERE HAS BEEN NO
RAIN FOR EIGHTEEN MONTHS,” so apparently that year drought was State wide.
Then followed a great flood in the winter of 1841-42 and this was followed by a
period of subnormal rainfall which lasted for forty-one years or until 1883.
It might be of interest to note that, on December 3rd, 1929, a San Jose
newspaper printed the following: “California's unprecedented drought is not
unprecedented, but comes on the one hundredth anniversary of one of twenty-two
months' duration between 1828 and 1830. This is according to an old newspaper
clipping in the possession of Mrs. William Chappell of San Jose. The clipping is
pasted tightly in a scrapbook picked up years ago in a deserted mining cabin in
a Northern California county. Dated 1864, the clipping refers to 'the great
drought of twenty-two months' duration between the rains of 1828 and those of
1830, in which so little fell that every interest in the country suffered.' All
the wells and springs of Monterey gave out during the drought and not only had
the washing of the town to be done at the Carmelo River, three miles off, but
the drinking water had also to be brought for the families.”
The year 1919 was a very dry season; the Sacramento Bee on August 25th, quoted
Major P. M. Narboe, assistant State Engineer as stating that, “it was the dryest
season experienced since 1877, there being an extreme scarcity of water in both
the Sacramento and the San Joaquin Valleys.” (I wonder if it was because that
was the year the United States “went dry” with prohibition and the whole
population, including myself, experienced a “drought.”)
So I repeat what I stated at the beginning of this chapter, that statements
“that the weather is changing” are not correct; these cycles of a series of dry
years and wet years, are simply, “history repeating itself.”
Since 1910, we have had a cycle of “below normal” rainfall and snowfall, but the
last two winters would make it appear that the cycle is now broken and probably
we are now entering into another cycle of wet years; that, however remains to be
seen. The carrying out of the State's Water Conservation Plan is the answer to
future protection against some future long cycle of dry years, which without
question will surely occur.
CHAPTER LXXXIX
How I Lost an Opportunity to be Sent to State Prison
IN 1913, a new Grand Jury had come into existence, and one day one of the
members, Mr. Ike G. Cohn, a prominent merchant who had known me from childhood,
came to my office and said he wanted to have a confidential talk with me. I
suggested we talk just outside the office but he insisted that we go to the rear
of the store, explaining that what he wanted to talk to me was very confidential
and he had “been sworn to secrecy,” and that I must treat the information he was
about to give me as strictly confidential. He certainly aroused my curiosity and
I had not the slightest idea what was on his mind. He then informed me that it
was in connection with the three members of the Levee Commission, particularly
myself.
He said that the Grand Jury had met that day and that the Superior Judge had
appeared before them and had told them it was their duty to indict all three
members of the Levee Commission because during the 1907 flood, Mr. John C.
White, one of the Commission had sold a lot of shovels and lanterns, etc., and
that my father and myself, the other two members of the Commission had also sold
a large lot of sacks to the levee for use during that flood. Also, that my
father and myself had again, during the 1909 flood, sold a large number of sacks
to the Commission, for use on the levee; that it was absolutely against the law
for any of the three Commissioners to be interested in any way in the sale of
such goods, etc., and demanded that the Grand Jury proceed to bring in
indictments against us, particularly as it was a well known fact that we had
done these things.
When Ike had finished his story, I told him I appreciated his coming to me and
informing me “what was in the wind”; that I had heard “whisperings” in
connection with this matter for some time, that it was about time to “shed the
light of day” on such matters and bring the whole thing out in the open and that
I wanted him to promise me, that he would tell the Grand Jury that they should
bring in an indictment against me personally, because I had really been the one
responsible and to use every effort to have an indictment found against me. He
was rather surprised at my request, but as I told him that he would be doing me
a personal favor, he promised to do so. He afterwards told me that he had done
so, but the Grand Jury never took any action. Again, when the Grand Jury for
1908-09 was appointed, the matter was again brought to the attention of this new
Grand Jury, and this time, without any names being used, the Appeal commented on
the recommended action in a news story. But again, the Grand Jury took no
action.
Later on, when I left the Commission to become a member of the State Reclamation
Board, I had our Levee Commission books experted by Mr. F. E. Smith, for the
full time I had been President, and Mr. Smith's report was in very great detail;
I had same published in a booklet of 24 pages and issued them broadcast. From
same, I give herewith an extract of part of my report, which was attached to the
Smith audit, which included some letters regarding the furnishing of sacks, etc.
“You will doubtless remember the high water of March 1907, and may also remember
that all telephone and telegraph communications with upper Feather River points,
were all cut off and no news of river conditions was obtainable on the evening
of the 18th inst. At about 11 o'clock that night it was presumed that the river
had about reached its greatest height but about midnight, however, another very
unexpected and rapid raise of the river occurred on the north levee. Orders were
hastily issued for teams and men to immediately assemble at the Ellis Company
store, hardware stores were broken into and shovels and lanterns were obtained
and taken to the Ellis store, where sacks were in readiness and within an hour
over 150 men with supplies were on the north levee and many more followed
shortly. I did not stop to consider the matter of sending about town to see if
other firms had sacks for sale; I didn't have time, in fact I never was so busy
in my life as I was just then; the Ellis Company I KNEW had the sacks for just
such an emergency, they were handy, they were wanted P.D.Q. and they went to the
front. For many years, it had been the practice of the Ellis Company to keep on
hand during each winter season, an average of ten thousand sacks (grain sacks)
left over from summer season sales; they were carried by the Ellis Company on
their own account, they had their own money invested in them and were only kept
in stock for levee emergency purposes; if not used, they would be sold the
following season. Had I been technical and wasted time trying to find sacks
elsewhere and then not found them and then had refused to use the Ellis Company
sacks because it was illegal to have done so, Marysville would have been flooded
that night.”
In 1909, as usual, the Ellis Company had sacks on hand for emergency purposes;
the Southern Pacific Company had flood troubles before high water mark was
reached at Marysville; they wanted sacks and I refused to sell them, as the
following letters will show and which I obtained a few days after the flood had
subsided.
Marysville, Calif. Jan. 18th, 1909.
THE W. T. ELLIS CO.
Marysville, Cal.
GENTLEMEN:
This is to confirm the several conversations had with you over 'phone the last
few days wherein we asked that you sell us sacks which we desired for use in
protecting our embankments and note your reply each time to the effect that you
felt compelled to reserve for the City levees all the sacks you had on hand and
referring us to the J. R. Garrett Company and the Sperry Flour Company of this
City for supplies in this line.
Yours truly,
SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY
R. F. WATSON, Agent.
It then appeared that the flood might be the greatest yet experienced and that
we might not have enough on hand, so I inquired about additional sacks, as the
following letters will show.
Marysville, Cal. January 20, 1909.
THE W. T. ELLIS CO.
Marysville, Cal.
DEAR SIRS:--
We confirm conversation had with you over 'phone yesterday to the effect that we
had sold all the grain bags we had on hand to the Railroad Company with the
exception of 1000 sacks and these latter bags, as per your request we will
reserve for the Levee Commissioners.
Yours truly,
J. R. GARRETT CO.
By E. B. WILCOX.
Marysville, Cal. January 20, 1909.
THE W. T. ELLIS CO.
Marysville, Cal.
GENTLEMEN:
Regarding your order for bags, beg to advise that we have none on hand, our
entire stock having been sold to the railroad company.
Very truly yours,
SPERRY FLOUR CO.
By L. S. HICKS, Manager.
We happened to have less sacks on hand ourselves than usual and that was the
reason we not only declined to sell any sacks to the railroad company, but
attempted to purchase some additional quantity; I wanted to play safe. We did
use a quantity of sacks on the levee that season, but not as many as in 1907, as
our levees had been raised in the mean time. What sacks we did use on the
Marysville levee we did pay for from the City levee fund. Because of the
“whisperings” which had been going on after the 1907 flood, I requested the
three above letters, these letters were published in the audit
which I had made in 1913 and which I had printed in booklet and issued to the
public. That booklet put a stop to the “whisperings.”
The total amount of sacks which the Ellis Company sold to the Levee Commission
in the three floods of 1904, 1907 and 1909, cost $974; there was possibly 10 per
cent profit on these transactions; had the $974 been all profit, the services of
the Levee Commissioners might have been worth that much alone for having
protected the City from inundation; no doubt, some will criticize that
statement. (Criticism is the art of telling other people what to do which they
themselves, are unable to do.) I believe that public officials particularly
should obey the law; I have always insisted upon that as a public official with
other public officials, but when an emergency exists, which requires immediate
action to protect the lives and property of citizens, I admit I have “cut red
tape” and have violated the law on several occasions and would not hesitate to
do the same thing over again, under similar circumstances. I believe that to be
just plain common sense, and no one would ever find me pleading “the statute of
limitations” on what violations I have been possibly guilty of in the past.
CHAPTER XC
First Training Walls, Above and Below, from Daguerre Point
THE control of the flow of debris in the Yuba River was an early day problem. In
1880 the State Legislature appropriated about $200,000 for a debris dam, largely
through the efforts of W. H. Parks of Marysville, who was the Speaker of the
Legislative Assembly.
The dam was constructed of earth, brush, logs, etc., across the river, its north
end being at the old Dan Shay ranch, about one and a half miles southeast of the
present “Seven Mile House,” the south end being where the town of Marigold is
situated. This dam was built in one season and just completed before a freshet
came down the river and destroyed it. Many efforts were afterwards made to
obtain both Federal and State appropriations for restraining works; many
engineers and occasionally representatives of Congress would pay us visits; I
would always see that they were taken up to Daguerre Point to look over the
situation; at times I would take some of them down the river from Daguerre Point
to Marysville by rowboats; we always furnished plenty of food and liquid
refreshments; they would express their appreciation of the entertainment and be
very liberal with their promises but we obtained no appropriations. On June 28,
1901 the Rivers and Harbors Committee of Congress paid us a visit, most of them
brought their wives and daughters, their expenses were paid with Federal funds.
Plans had formerly been formulated for dams across the river to hold back debris
and we were endeavoring to obtain Federal approval of $400,000 to be matched
with $400,000 from the State of California, on which latter the State had
already taken favorable action.
It was a very hot day, the women in the party were entertained by local town
ladies at the Rideout Home; all the men were taken in busses and buggies on the
north side of the river, where the sites of the proposed dams were, then to
Timbuctoo to view the old hydraulic mining pits, then back to Marysville via the
south side of the river. They were all out for a good time, the only one of the
delegation who attended strictly to the business in hand was Congressman Burton,
who always had by his side Colonel Huer, Colonel Smith, Captain Deakyne and
Engineer Vischer and those were the ones I stuck close to; the balance had all
the “eats and liquid refreshments” on the trip they wanted; we spent about $1000
that day on their entertainment. We waited for results and I began to get as
discouraged as a woodpecker in a petrified forest, but finally in 1902 Congress
approved the project and work commenced on the first dam or “barrier” which was
largely a crib dam affair, filled with large rock and which in my opinion
promised to be as permanent as a woman's “permanent wave,” and so finally proved
to be, as the first freshet period in the river, caused a total failure of the
dam. Later on, a concrete dam, resting on piles was constructed; it was a very
fine structure, but it also failed in the flood of 1907. Work also was performed
on the “settling basin” near Hammonton, a large sum was expended on this project
but it proved impractical and was abandoned; the actual fact was, that when this
“settling basin” was first planned, the river, in addition to moving large
quantities of fine sand and gravel, was also moving great quantities of fine
silt “slickens,” carried in suspension and it was this latter material which it
was planned to have “settle” in the artificial settling basin. Such a long time
ensued, however, after the plans were made, and were finally carried out, that
in the meantime, this flow of “slickens” had largely been exhausted and only
sand and gravel remained to be carried down the river and these latter materials
were too heavy to be carried into the settling basin through the intake gates.
By that time the greater portion of the $800,000 had been expended and without
any beneficial results. It was then decided to make a new artificial river
through a “cut” to be made in Daguerre Point, the upper end to be protected with
a concrete “lip” about 660 feet long, the crown to be about twelve feet above
the old river bed and in that way reduce the slope of the river and impound
debris. Gold dredging had commenced shortly before this and an arrangement was
made with that company to build a dam from the south end of Daguerre Point to
the river's south bank, (where Hammonton now is), this dam to consist of dredge
piles. When this was accomplished, the entire river was then diverted through
the artificial “cut.”
This work was performed by the dredger company without cost to the Federal
Government, the dredger company obtaining its reimbursement and profit from the
gold recoveries. This “cut” was and always since has been a great success.
Still later on, the river area upstream from this “cut” was mined by dredgers
the work being performed so as to leave two parallel channels for a distance of
about three miles upstream, where they joined, making one channel as the river
became narrow. Finally it was planned for one large channel, 2000 feet in width,
down stream fror Daguerre Point; the dredger company agreed to construct a
dredge wall on the south side of the river for a distance of about two and a
half miles, while on the north side, the California Debris Commission let a
contract to A. Munson of Stockton to construct an earth levee on the north side
of the river for a distance of about two miles. When this work was performed and
when the first good flood occurred, the river having a fall of about nine feet
to the mile, the attempt was made to reduce its gradient, by running in curves
or “zigzag” and this resulted in a break in the north earthen levee.
Arrangements were made for repairs, and a contract let to A. Munson in the sum
of $50,000. Before he commenced this work, I had ascertained that the dredger
company had plans for the construction of a new dredge so I immediately took the
matter up with them and suggested that they construct this dredge about where
the levee had failed and replace about one mile of the down stream portion of
the earth levee with a dredge embankment; take over the contract which Mr.
Munson had for the job, pay him his contemplated profit, he not do any of the
work himself. Approval to the plan was obtained from the Federal Engineers, Mr.
Munson turned over his contract to the dredge company for $15,000 profit and the
dredge was built and reconstructed the lower portion of the training wall with a
cobble embankment; this took about a year to complete. When this job was to be
completed, it was then planned by the dredge company to take its dredge across
the river to the south side where their main holdings were, but the job which
they had performed on the north training wall looked so substantial, that before
the job was finished I took the matter up with the dredge company to see if it
was not possible to have the dredge continue upstream the remaining distance to
the main hill and replace that portion of the earth levee with a dredge
embankment also. I was told by Mr. W. P. Hammon that the values which they had
recovered had been very “lean” as compared with the south side of the river and
that the proposal was not attractive, but that if I would purchase the right of
way for the job at no expense to them and they would be permitted to retain the
gold recoveries, and if I would also raise a bonus of $45,000 in cash to be paid
them for doing the work, his Company might be interested. I then contacted the
California Debris Commission, dwelt on the advantages of having a dredge
embankment in place of an earth embankment, as unquestionably, if the earth
embankment was repaired, it would no doubt at some future time fail again and so
cause the Government more expense for repairs; this resulted in the California
Debris Commission agreeing to advance the $45,000 requested of them. I then
proceeded to attempt to obtain a right of way for a strip of ground upon which
the dredge could operate in building the rock wall. This was largely one private
holding belonging to James O'Brien, Sr., of Smartsville and after considerable
negotiations, was successful, but had to agree to purchase the entire large
holding. The entire cost was approximately $15,000 of which $10,000 was paid to
Mr. O'Brien; I “passed the hat” and obtained the money, a contract was drawn up
between the dredge company and the California Debris Commission and signed, the
land was paid for and the dredge continued on its way on the job; this took
about another year to perform and when completed, the dredge crossed south to
the opposite side of the river. Shortly afterwards, I sold the area which had
been purchased for the $15,000 but not dredged, for $7,500 and refunded that
amount to the original donors.
We were congratulating ourselves on having obtained a dredge levee, about two
miles long and which closed off the main branch of the river known generally as
the “Kupser channel.” This for many years had caused us lots of trouble and
worry as it extended for a long distance, immediately at the base of our levee,
for a distance of about three miles and the river had gradually built up its bed
there until at one point, where the Browns Valley road leaves the base of the
levee (about two miles east of the City limits), the bed of the river was
thirteen feet higher than the farming land on the north or land side of the
river. (This is the same situation there today, but the main river channel now
is about three-quarters of a mile distant to the south and in subsequent years
the river has scoured to such an extent that flood waters no longer reach our
old levee at this place.)
Later on we found that we had been congratulating ourselves too soon, when a
succeeding flood broke this cobble training wall, which had looked to us like a
“rock of ages.” The reasons for this failure and how those difficulties were
taken care of, will be explained in the next chapter.
CHAPTER XCI
Construction of Two Parallel 750 Foot Channels Down Stream from Daguerre Point
AFTER the failure of the cobble training wall on the north side of the Yuba
River channel, it became very evident to me that these dredge built training
walls, while they appeared strong enough to withstand any floods, the fact
remained that if flood waters did not run parallel with them, but on the
contrary, if the river current flowed in an irregular manner and the current
struck the walls at a sharp angle, “they would melt away like a brick of butter
on a summer day.” Therefore I came to the conclusion that the only thing to do
to prevent the river running “zigzag” within the 2000 feet width between these
training walls, was to have that entire area dredged, the dredge to be equipped
with “side stackers” so as to construct two parallel channels, in which the
flood waters would be compelled to run parallel with the banks and have no
opportunity to “side swipe” the walls and endanger them, these channels to be
about 750 feet in width.
I took the matter up with Colonel Rand of the California Debris Commission and
he disapproved of the plan; I had him come up and look over the situation on the
ground but he still declined to approve; I persisted for about two years but
without results.
Colonel Rand was then transferred to some other post and Major U .S. Grant III
took his place on the Commission. I then took the matter up with Major Grant; he
came up and looked over the situation and immediately was “sold” on the plan but
said “I thoroughly approve the idea but it will take a lot of money for such a
big job and we have no money available for such a purpose”; I told him that all
I wanted was his approval and no money; he replied, “You have the approval, now
it is up to you to hustle up the money for rights of way and arrange to have the
dredger company enter into an agreement with the Commission for necessary
permits.”
Having obtained the approval of Major Grant, I then took the matter up by letter
with Mr. W. P. Hammon, representing the dredger company. Under date of July 7,
1922, Mr. Hammon replied, stating in his letter that “the proposition as it has
been presented to us thus far does not appeal to us very strongly”--“it will be
necessary for you to obtain all necessary rights of way, in addition to long
term options on some of the lands further down stream, etc., before we would
care to go into this matter further”--“in other words, Mr. Ellis, when you have
all necessary rights of way, options, etc., covering the tentative proposition
for river improvements, etc., then and not until then, will we go into this
matter fully with you.”
This put me up against rather a difficult proposition and for some months, I was
carrying on negotiations between the California Debris Commission and Mr. Hammon
but finally an agreement was arrived at. This agreement between the dredger
company and the California Debris Commission was consummated in December 1922;
in the meantime, I had obtained agreements from the several private property
owners to purchase their holdings in the river channel; it was practically
worthless land, being almost entirely sand and gravel but nevertheless I had to
“pass the hat” and obtained the necessary money for same, amounting to about
$40,000 while the California Debris Commission finally agreed to contribute some
$40,000 towards the work. It took a lot of time and complicated negotiations
before everything was arranged for and a dredge started on this work. In 1924
construction of these two channels was commenced taking about nine years to
complete.
The first real test was in 1928 when the flood occurred; only the north channel
being completed at that time, the dredge being at work on the south channel
which was blocked on its upper end. This 1928 flood, which was a maximum one,
discharged 140,000 second feet of water through this north 750 foot channel,
doing no damage to the side walls because the flood was confined and compelled
to flow parallel with the side wall cobble banks. Upon completion of the
agreements for the doing of this work, just mentioned, I received the following
letters:
San Francisco, Calif., December 13, 1922.
Mr. W. T. Ellis,
Marysville, Cal.
DEAR MR. ELLIS:
We are in receipt of your letter of the 12th instant in which you state that we
are in no ways indebted to you for the work which you have done in the
acquisition of deeds and options to the various property in the Yuba River
bottom west of Daguerre Point. We fully realize the amount of work you have done
and the time you have devoted to carrying out this project, and the attitude you
take is both public spirited and generous. We, for ourselves, cannot thank you
too much and we believe Major Grant not only fully appreciates all you have
done, but will agree with us that the negotiations which you have so
successfully carried through could not have been accomplished by any one else,
and we know that Mr. Hammon will want to express to you his thanks at the first
opportunity.
Very truly yours,
HAMMON ENGINEERING COMPANY,
Mines Operating Dept.
By CHAS. W. GARDNER.
San Francisco, Cal., January 30, 1923.
MR. W. T. ELLIS,
Marysville, Cal.
MY DEAR MR. ELLIS: Subject: Acquisition of property rights for the South
Training Wall, Yuba River.
1. Your letter of January 25, 1923, seems to be the final proof that you are
quite a wizard in arranging things and I am very much obliged to you for your
cooperation and help in obtaining the rights of way and easements necessary for
us to insure the ultimate construction of the South Training Wall in the Yuba
River.
2. Immediately upon receiving your letter I tried to get into telephone
communication with the Hammon Engineering Company and after some little delay,
was finally assured by Mr. Gardner that the Kupser property option was being
taken up yesterday, Monday. This information I included in my telegram last
night.
Yours truly.
U.S. GRANT, 3RD,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.
CHAPTER XCII
Benefits of Dredge Mining on Yuba River
DREDGE MINING on the Yuba River commenced in 1904. The first boats mined about
sixty feet deep, but they now have one which mines about one hundred and thirty
feet deep. This is the largest in the world. The altitude where this boat is
dredging is approximately one hundred feet above sea level, so this dredge is
digging about thirty feet below sea level and from borings which have been made,
the gravel is still at a greater depth. In fact, tests disclose one hundred and
eighty feet of gravel, how much more is unknown. There is a probability that all
the dredged area will be redredged, in fact a considerable area has and is being
re-dredged, the advanced price of gold being a contributing factor.
When these dredging operations commenced and had been in progress for some time,
our citizens, because of past experiences with hydraulic mining, were still
“anti-mining minded” and discussions arose as to whether these dredgers would in
their digging operations, loosen up a lot of material which would be brought
down the river and deposited and still further raise the river bed at Marysville
which had been steadily raising for many years as shown by the cross-sections
which I had been having made each year. At first I had the same thought in mind
but I was constantly visiting the boats, watching their operations and
ascertaining what their plans were and came to the conclusion that these
operations would not have the effect of assisting the river to move greater
amounts of debris down the river but that, on the contrary, they would be able
eventually to impound perpetually the greater portion of the three hundred
millions of mining debris, which the Government reports showed was in the river
overflow area between Marysville and Daguerre Point.
These murmurings on the part of many of our citizens finally culminated in a
call for a mass meeting of citizens to consider the matter and at that meeting,
some of the more rabid citizens demanded that a resolution be passed condemning
dredge mining and that legal steps be taken by the Anti-Debris Association to
stop this type of mining, etc. I was sitting in the rear of the hall, taking no
part in the proceedings but was finally called on, which I had been rather
expecting. There were about two hundred citizens present and my first words
were, “How many in this audience have actually been up and viewed these dredge
operations, those who have, please hold up their hands.” There were about ten
hands raised; I then asked those who had raised their hands to get up, each in
turn, and explain just what the dredgers were doing; several attempted to
explain but it was quite evident they did not know exactly what was being done.
I then stated that I had made many personal observations and had come to the
conclusion that this mining was going to be beneficial and not detrimental and
suggested, that as the large majority present evidently knew nothing of the
situation, it might be well to adjourn the meeting until the next evening and
that next morning, as many as could, make a trip up to the dredgers and see
exactly what was going on and then form their own conclusions. Then if they
thought it the proper thing to do, at next evening's meeting, pass such
resolutions as they thought proper. My suggestion prevailed and the next morning
a cavalcade of buggies, busses started to the scene of operations, were shown
everything to be seen, were shown that the fine material which was dredged was
first deposited behind the dredger and then “weighed” down with the gravel and
cobbles so that it would be impossible for this material to wash down the river.
It was also explained that these dredgers could operate in such a manner that
the various river channels could eventually be effectively controlled, etc. That
evening, the mass meeting was again held and resolutions adopted to the effect
that dredge mining on the Yuba River was not harmful and could no doubt prove
very beneficial. That was about thirty years ago and ever since, there have been
no complaints made locally about this type of mining.
Since that time, there have been sporadic attempts made in the Legislature to
curb or prevent this type of mining but never with any success.
A Sacramento newspaper, had for a number of years, from time to time, contained
editorials against dredge mining and finally on December 21, 1936, instructed
their local representative to call on the County Assessor to ascertain what
amount of assessed valuation and taxes had been lost in Yuba County because of
this mining, how many acres had been dredged and what percentage of these lands
had been suitable for grain, fruit, grazing, etc., etc. The County Assessor, Mr.
J. U. Pearson, called me into consultation and together we dug up all the
information we could obtain which was then formulated into a letter, which Mr.
Pearson addressed to this Sacramento paper as a reply.
It was shown that during the past thirty odd years of dredge mining on the Yuba
River that approximately nine square miles had been dredged out of the 630
square miles in the County.
That when dredging had commenced, the greater portion of this area had been
“waste” lands, covered with mining debris, the balance being “marginal” lands,
fit only for grazing principally.
That previous to dredge operations, the old assessment rolls showed that the
greater portion of this area had been assessed at about ten dollars per acre.
That as a result of dredge mining with the resultant concentration of the river
in one main channel, that this main channel had scoured about twenty feet, and
that a very large area of debris covered lands, thickly grown up with brush and
timber, was kept from overflow at flood periods with the result that these large
areas had been cleared of brush and trees by the owners, placed in cultivable
condition, orchards, vineyards, alfalfa and other crops were now being raised on
these lands and the old assessment had been raised from about $10 per acre to an
average of about $80 per acre, which latter did not include further assessments
on “improvements.”
That as a result, in place of there being reduced assessments and loss of taxes
in Yuba County because of dredge mining, there had been an actual increase of
about $400,000 in the assessment roll and a corresponding increase in taxes
received.
Also, as result of these mining operations, that during the last 32 years of
operations, over $10,000,000 had been expended in wages besides and expenditure
of some $12,000,000 for capital investment, which also included a large
proportion of labor.
This Sacramento paper then had a representative sent up from Sacramento to check
up on this letter; he was shown all over the situation and returned satisfied
and presumably so reported to his newspaper as nothing more has been heard from
them.
The fact is, that dredge mining on the Yuba River, resulted in very efficient
debris control; it also resulted in safe flood control to the levees on both
banks of the Yuba River, from Hammonton westerly to Marysville, in fact, it made
obsolete, about five miles of the easterly Marysville levees and a similar
length of levee on the south bank of the Yuba River.
CHAPTER XCIII
Right of Way Agent for Western Pacific Railroad
WHEN the Western Pacific ran surveys for their railroad, they had two tentative
plans with two different surveys north of Marysville. One survey was for a line
where the road is now constructed; the other was more to the west. Both plans,
however, were with the idea of having the railroad run north and south through
Marysville on F Street. This latter was objectionable to the public and I went
to San Francisco to consult with the railroad official who was in full charge at
that time. It was pointed out to him that the easterly survey north of town
would be beneficial in reclaiming more lands north of the City, if they
constructed an earth embankment (which they would in any event have to do to
keep out of floods) and that it could form a back levee and that the land owners
to the west would probably form a reclamation district and build up other levees
to the north, west and south, enclosing some 10,000 acres; that in the past,
these land owners had constructed a poor system of levees on the east bank of
the Feather River but had no protection from the rear, and that, if the railroad
company would co-operate, that probably the east survey for a right of way could
be obtained at very reasonable prices from the respective land owners.
I also pointed out the objections of the public to having the railroad bisect
the town on F Street, that I was President of the Levee Commission and could use
my influence to get them a free right of way on the top of our westerly and
north levees in return for a guarantee for maintenance for fifty years. This
resulted in conferences in Marysville; and finally agreements were executed
between the railroad company, the Mayor and Council and the Levee Commission,
and franchises were given. We did not know at that time just what financial
interests were behind the proposed new railroad, but later on it developed that
the Gould interests were planning for a transcontinental railroad in opposition
to the Southern Pacific Company, and when actual construction was about to
commence, Mr. V. G. Bogue was placed in full and complete charge.
I made it my business to get acquainted with Mr. Bogue, reviewed the situation
about the two surveys north of town and this resulted in an offer to appoint me
right of way agent for Yuba County. I accepted the position, as I felt that I
could be of assistance to them and obtain some favors for the City and the Levee
Commission in return.
In answer to my question as to just how I was to proceed, Mr. Bogue stated that
his engineers would give me the legal descriptions of the rights of way wanted
over various private property and that I was to make my own agreements about
prices to be paid to the owners of said property; and, when such agreements were
made, their local attorney, W. H. Carlin, would draw up the deeds and have them
properly executed; then I was to pay the owner with a draft drawn on the
Treasurer of the Company in San Francisco, and it would be honored. I then asked
him about what price he would expect to pay per acre plus any severances or
damages. He replied, “We will expect you to get these rights of way as cheaply
as you can and will leave the matter of price to your own good judgment and, if
you succeed in getting all these rights of way for an average price of one
hundred dollars per acre, we will be mighty well pleased.” I told him that was
all I wanted to know.
I was busy with the store those days and could work on this new job only at odd
times, mostly Sundays. It took me several months but, when I had finished the
job, I had obtained the rights of way through Yuba County for an average of $42
per acre, and Mr. Bogue was immensely pleased. He then wanted me to buy their
rights of way through the City of Sacramento, but I informed him that I could
not spare the time from my private business. He had been paying me $150 per
month for my services and told me I could name my own salary if I would tackle
the Sacramento rights of way; but I told him that, while I had perhaps been able
to make a record in Yuba County where I was personally well acquainted with the
land owners, I surely could not be so successful elsewhere.
I really had an interesting time buying these rights of way through Yuba County.
The automobile was then a new thing, there were only about a half dozen in
Marysville and many people had never seen one. There was only one in town for
hire. This was a small Oldsmobile, with one seat, a dashboard in front and a
small open box in the rear; it was guided with a long stick as a handle; I
believe it had one cylinder, and it sneezed and coughed like a consumptive, but
could travel at the high speed of twenty-five miles per hour. The owner did the
driving and charged me $20 per day. It saved me time, however, over a horse and
buggy and was of material assistance in getting rights of way. When I called on
some ranch owner with this machine to talk right of way with him, I soon found
out that, to first take the family out for a ride of one or two miles or so and
give them a “thrill” by having their first ride and going so fast, permitted me
to come to agreements quickly and satisfactorily. If there was some hesitation
about signing up deeds, which there was in a couple of cases, I promised to come
back soon and give them a ten mile ride. That settled the deal and I afterwards
kept my promise.
A few years afterwards, I was calling on the Western Pacific office in San
Francisco and one of the officials reminded me of my expense accounts with the
charge of $20 a day for an automobile and said that when several of these
charges had come through, an auditor had complained of my extravagance, that I
could have hired a horse and buggy for $5 a day, that he had mentioned the
matter to Mr. Bogue who had remarked, “Hell! Leave him alone. See what he is
getting those rights of way for us for.”
North of town, by making promises that the railroad would be on a high earth
embankment, which could act as a back levee, I obtained several miles of right
of way for only the nominal sum of $10 per deed. This back levee being
furnished, induced the land owners to form what is now known as Reclamation
District No. 10.
After the railroad company had obtained their franchise on the levee, they
planned to follow on top of the Yuba River levee to the foot of about B Street
and then have a bridge across the Yuba River, quite close to the Southern
Pacific bridge, the passenger station to be on top of the levee at the foot of E
Street, and franchise was granted them under that plan. We soon realized that we
had made a mistake, that this passenger and freight depot, being so close to the
D Street bridge, the bridge would at times be blocked by standing trains to the
great inconvenience of traveling public. In the meantime, the freight building
had been constructed (now occupied by the Marysville Fuel Co.), so we had
meetings with the Mayor and Council and the suggestion was made that a passenger
and freight depot be erected on top of the levee at 5th and K Streets, so that
it would be convenient to both Yuba City and Marysville. The company's officials
were not in a very receptive mood but they finally agreed when I suggested that
the City give them, free of charge, quite a large area on the south side of
Third Street, between Orange and J Streets, which could be used for future side
tracks, etc. This area I had purchased when I was Mayor from Chas. Covillaud,
Jr., for the sum of $200 and had then resold it to the City for the same amount;
but when I sold it to the City, I had placed a reservation in the deed to the
effect that it was to be used for the sole purpose of furnishing material to the
citizens free of charge so that they could obtain material for filling in their
slough lots, which work was then under way, and, if the area was used for any
other purpose, it would revert back to me. This difficulty was overcome,
however, by the City deeding the area back to me and I, in turn, deeding same to
the Western Pacific without any consideration. This area is now where the Ball
Grounds are situated with the permission of the railroad company. My employment
with the Western Pacific Co. lasted about twelve months.
CHAPTER XCIV
State Reclamation Board
THE FIRST two years on the Reclamation Board were rather hectic; many
complicated problems came before the Board for solution, and decisions, after
hearings held before the Board, had to be rendered. The Board's powers were
limited, being confined in effect to passing upon reclamation plans with the
purpose of preventing construction of levees which would interfere with the
flood control project. Many applications for reclamation were received, hearings
held and in almost every case, there was a division of ideas on the part of the
interested land owners; each side would be represented by lawyers and engineers
and these hearings became quite animated at times and very considerable feelings
manifested. The Board would take such applications under consideration and when
so considered by the Board members, at times there was also a divergence of
opinion between the Board members themselves which resulted in very animated
arguments and final decisions were not always unanimous.
One of the problems which came to the Board at that time was the location of the
Sutter By-pass in the application of the Armour interests for the reclamation of
about 40,000 acres of the Sutter Basin. The original plans for the by-pass
provided that this by-pass follow the trough of the basin, extending southerly
through the center of the proposed reclaimed area, making for two reclamation
districts, on the east and west sides of the proposed by-pass; application was
made before the Board under this plan and was taken under consideration and was
being considered favorably but when the Board was ready to take favorable action
at the following meeting, the application was withdrawn and was followed by a
new application, which called for a shift of the by-pass from the original
central location, to a new easterly location so as to permit of there being one
large reclamation district in place of two divided reclamation districts.
When finally a hearing was held on this new plan, the land owners in Reclamation
District No. 1, of Sutter County, an old established reclamation district,
immediately made strenuous objections to the plan and “the war was on” in
earnest. The three Board members, feeling that they were more or less a judicial
body, listened to both sides, expressing no opinions but endeavoring to bring
out full information, in fact, the three Board members themselves did not commit
themselves as between each other. When the matter finally came up before the
Board to make a decision, the vote disclosed that Mr. McClatchy and Mr. Cook
were in favor of the change while I voted against the change in the by-pass
location. I had previously prepared a long written argument, giving my reasons
for my opposition to the application, which was afterwards printed in a booklet
and circulated quite extensively.
As a result of the Board's action, suits were commenced to prevent the newly
adopted plan by the interested land owners of Sutter County; the matter was also
brought up before the Legislature and for about five years the contest raged
before two legislatures and in the Courts before the matter came to a final
decision by the Supreme Court of the State, which upheld the decision of the
majority members of the Reclamation Board.
It was a mighty interesting fight; at joint meetings of the two houses of the
Legislature, to listen to the arguments from both sides, the Assembly Chamber
would be crowded with spectators, but each time, it was quite apparent that the
legislators, after listening to the arguments, pro and con, were “all at sea”
and did not understand the problem any better after these hearings than they did
before they were held.
Mr. William Kent of Marin County was Congressman from this District at that
time; he had been elected to Congress an “Independent” and could afford to be
independent as he was very wealthy. He became interested in the controversy and
came to Marysville to see me and get information, bringing with him a prominent
engineer, Mr. Dockweiler. We met in Mr. Kent's room in the hotel here in July
1916 and he had employed a young lady stenographer to take full notes of the
proceedings. Several hours were taken up, both Mr. Kent and Mr. Dockweiler
asking me questions and I giving the answers. When the meeting was over, Mr.
Kent instructed the young lady to type up her stenographic notes and send same
to him. A few days afterwards, I received a letter from Mr. Kent stating that
the stenographer had written him, stating that she could not comply with his
request because she was unable to decipher all of her own stenographic notes and
expressing his disappointment. I wrote him in reply, stating that I was quite
certain that I could remember all the questions which both he and Mr. Dockweiler
had asked me and if he was agreeable to me doing so, that I would write up a
record of the meeting, showing the questions which both he and Mr. Dockweiler
had asked and the answers which I had given. This was agreeable to Mr. Kent and
I proceeded to do this work for him and sent copies both to him and Mr.
Dockweiler. In a few days I received letters from both of them; Mr. Dockweiler
was immensely amused; he said that the questions which I showed he had asked me,
would indicate that he had a knowledge of the problem which he knew he did not
possess; as for Mr. Kent, he stated that for the first time, he had a real
understanding of the problem and was going to be on “our side” and do what he
could to render assistance; that he had ordered several hundred copies printed
in booklet form and would have them distributed quite generally where they would
do the most good. He had copies placed on the desks of each member of the
Legislature for their information. When this was done, Mr. McClatchy in an
effort to counteract the effect the booklets might have, instructed Mr. E. A.
Bailey, State Flood Control Engineer to get up a counter report in reply and
this was also printed and circulated.
I doubt if there ever was a controversy before the Legislature which was so
confusing to the average layman as this Sutter By-pass fight; at the same time
it attracted State-wide attention with divided opinions but in Yuba and Sutter
Counties, the people were practically unanimous for the originally planned,
central location for the by-pass. It was a long-drawn and hard fight and our
side lost by a Supreme Court decision, and which, “boiled down” to plain words,
was to the effect that while the proposed central location of the by-pass
followed the natural and well established drainage alignment, still, the
diversion of this drainage, if conducted on the proposed eastern location of the
by-pass, on higher ground was “equally as good drainage,” notwithstanding the
fact, that it would result in a higher flood water plane, a longer by-pass, the
discharge of about five-sixths of the Sacramento River flood water into the
Feather River, in place of directly into the upper end of the Yolo Basin,” etc.,
etc. It always appeared to me to have been an illogical and “far fetched”
decision and from an engineering point of view, an unfortunate one and I still
hold to that idea and that it will be so demonstrated some day when a “super
flood” occurs, which it surely will some day. When that time arrives, I firmly
believe that my views are correct, particularly that since then, the Fremont
Weir at the intake of the Yolo Basin By-pass has been constructed; that weir is
about 9000 feet long, is built of solid concrete, the greater portion of the
Bear, Yuba, Feather and Sacramento rivers have to escape over its crest into the
Yolo By-pass and the crest of that weir is three and a half feet higher than the
bottom of the Sutter By-Pass, 24 miles upstream. I objected to this planned
height when it came before the Reclamation Board for approval, but again I was
on the losing side. Time will tell who is right and some day we will get the
answer, but it is a remarkable fact, that since the Flood Control Plan in the
Sacramento Valley has been practically completed, at an expense of over fifty
million dollars, there has not been during that time a maximum flood occurring
on all the rivers at the same time, so the plan has yet to be given a test for
its efficiency.
When a general heavy storm occurs on all the watersheds of all those rivers, it
takes about ten hours for the American River to reach its crest at Sacramento
and that City is within the tidal prism; again, the Sacramento River under the M
Street bridge has a capacity of only some 110,000 second feet, while the
American River has a discharge of about 140,000 second feet, and to care for
this anomalous situation, the Reclamation Board had constructed, about four
miles upstream from Sacramento, at Bryte's Bend, the Sacramento By-pass, with
weir and gates, so that the excess waters from the American could “run upstream”
four miles and then be discharged into the Yolo Basin and relieve the pressure
against the levees at Sacramento. In 1928, the American was in full flood, the
apex reached Sacramento in about ten hours and touched highest water mark; they
got excited and opened the gates at the Bryte's Bend weir, but the river did not
fall, it simply “slowed up” the rise in the river and, remember, that it took
another two days about for the waters of the Bear, Yuba and Feather rivers to
reach that point and still another additional two days for the Sacramento River
waters also to reach there. Had there been a second storm, say six or seven days
after the first storm, on the American River and the second flood flow on the
American River had met the arriving waters from the other rivers above, then
with the Yolo Basin By-pass having been filled with water from the excess waters
of the first storm on the American in the meantime, and with possibly a full
moon, with resultant high tide and with a 50 mile south wind, which is not
unusual, this combination of circumstances (which partly happened in 1904),
would, I predict, cause the loss of proper functioning of the Bryte's Bend
By-pass, with what results--well it's any one's guess.
During the ten years I was on the Reclamation Board, we had many very animated
arguments over many complicated problems which came before the Board to be
solved; these arguments were generally between McClatchy, Cook, Atherton and
myself as the others had but little first-hand practical knowledge of conditions
generally, but they “held the balance of power,” when it came to voting.
They made several engineering errors of judgment, which I failed to prevent but
which some future flood will demonstrate; at least, that is my firm opinion.
CHAPTER XCV
Congressman Kent's Public Hearing at Marysville, November 9th, 1915
CONGRESSMAN KENT being considerably confused by the reports he received, pro and
con on the proper location of the Sutter By-Pass controversy, he arranged for a
meeting to obtain information. The following is a copy of the “corrected”
stenographic notes taken at this meeting, all of which was afterward published
in pamphlet form and distributed by Mr. Kent:
MR. KENT: On request of persons interested, I came to Marysville to look into
the question of the changing of the location of the Sutter By-Pass project. I
requested Mr. Dockweiler, a resident of San Francisco, and another engineer, Mr.
O'Shaughnessy, to come with me; the latter found it impossible to be on hand. I
wish to introduce Mr. Dockweiler. Mr. Dockweiler, kindly state your name,
occupation, etc.
MR. DOCKWEILER: My name is J. H. Dockweiler; I am a resident of San Francisco
and have been for the past 12 years serving as engineer to the City Attorney,
Mr. Percy E. Long, of the City of San Francisco, on matters of water supply, and
for 9 years I have been Consulting Engineer to the City Council of Oakland on
water supply and matters connected therewith. For several years, in the capacity
of Civil Engineer, I have been connected with various water supply and
irrigation projects of the City of Los Angeles and vicinity.
MR. KENT: I think that the best way that we could get into this matter would be
for Mr. W. T. Ellis, who is a member of the State Reclamation Board, to make a
general statement regarding the by-pass situation and then, after Mr. Ellis has
finished, I should like to have Mr. Dockweiler ask questions. I would also like
to hear from any other persons who are interested in the matter under
investigation and discussion.
MR. ELLIS: You are, of course, all familiar with the general plan of flood
control formulated by Captain Jackson of the California Debris Commission, which
plan was officially adopted by the State of California, and a State Reclamation
Board was created to carry same to actual completion. It will not be necessary,
therefore, to dwell upon this general plan and which, by the way, every member
of the State Reclamation Board is heartily in favor of, and is doing their
utmost to carry out; in other words, there is no division among the members as
regards the general flood control plan; the only division has been regarding a
change in the detail of the plan, in the Sutter Basin and which involves the
location of the by-pass which is necessary there for flood control. The original
plan of flood control formulated by Captain Jackson contemplated that this
by-pass be located in the natural trough of that basin and on what is generally
known as the “Central location.” Afterwards, this location of the by-pass was
abandoned by the majority members of the State Reclamation Board (which at that
time consisted of V. S. McClatchy, Peter Cook and myself), and the by-pass
located on what is generally known as the “Eastern location.” This abandonment
of the Central for the Eastern location was without my approval; mainly, for the
reason that it was a radical departure from the basic principle laid down in the
original plan of Captain Jackson and which was, that all by-passes should follow
the “natural troughs” of all the great basin areas. For confirmation of this one
has only to refer to Document 81, 62nd Congress, 1st Session; particularly to
pages 2, 3, 4, 5 and 37; on the latter mentioned page Mr. H. H. Wadsworth (the
engineer who performed the larger portion of the detail work on this plan)
states: (see line 1 of page 37) that “by-passes should occupy the troughs of the
basins,” etc., etc. This recommendation is only in line with good common sense,
and good engineering is only the application of good common sense to a problem.
To oppose the natural laws and the habits of the flow of a large volume of water
(in this case estimated to be, at flood stage, 220,000 sec. ft.) is a most
serious problem and experience should teach us that in deciding upon plans for
the control of flood waters, that the factor of safety must well be considered;
and when any doubt exists, the decision should be on the side of “Safety First”
and with the ideas of increasing, not decreasing the factor of safety. This
shift in the by-pass was recommended by the State Engineering Department of the
State of California, but the report attached herewith of the Federal Engineer,
Major S. A. Cheney, representing the California Debris Commission (Federal
Engineers), was to the effect that either the Central or Eastern location was
satisfactory to the Government, as the Government was not interested in
reclamation but was only interested in the navigation features; at the same
time, however, Major Cheney called attention to the greater flood heights which
would ensue in the Eastern location over what could be expected in the Central
location. While Major Cheney did not deem it his duty to go further than give
this latter warning, and looking at it from the Government's point of view,
reported that either location was satisfactory to the Government, still, for an
actual fact, he was really favorable (from the point of view of a practical
engineer) to the Central location. For proof of this statement see attached
letters from Mr. V. S. McClatchy and W. T. Ellis to Major Cheney, and also,
Major Cheney's reply to Mr. McClatchy.
MR. KENT: Mr. Ellis, did you ever make any reports and arguments which would
sustain your position as favoring the Central location of the by-pass in the
Sutter Basin?
MR. ELLIS: I did, and they were published in pamphlet form, with a report of
Engineers J. C. Boyd and Otto Von Geldern, also favoring the location of the
by-pass in the Central location. These pamphlets (there are three of them) I
have with me and am now pleased to give them to you. These reports give, in
detail the many reasons why the “Central location” is preferable to the “Eastern
location” and they will speak for themselves.
MR. KENT: I would like to ask, was there ever an application for reclamation of
the Sutter Basin, based on the Central location of the by-pass as originally
planned?
MR. ELLIS: Yes sir, there was. This application was made on September 4, 1912,
to the Reclamation Board by J. P. Snook and Granville Moore for a Reclamation
District of 35,000 acres lying between the Central location of the by-pass and
the Feather River, with a request to ensmall the Feather River overflow channel
to 1250 feet. Further hearing of this application was had on September 24, 1912,
at which time Mr. W. E. Gerber and others were also present and were favoring
the application. At another hearing before the Reclamation Board on September
29, 1912, on this same application, Major S. A. Cheney, of the California Debris
Commission, made a report under date of October 2, 1912, and therein called
attention to the fact that the proposed reclamation encroached upon the Central
by-pass location, some 300 yards; so, adding about 1300 acres to the
reclamation. Major Cheney's comments in his report are as follows: “The lines as
laid down in the flood control project are better for the following reasons:
1st, they follow more closely the trough of the basin. 2nd, they will cause no
choke at the crossing of the S.P. Co.'s tracks. 3rd, they divide the acreage of
the Sutter Basin more equally, etc. It is considered that the flood plane
elevations of the flood control project are as high as should be permitted here,
and to insure their not being exceeded, the levee alignment given in the flood
control project should be followed.”
From this you will see that Major Cheney also favored following the line of
policy originally laid down by Captain Jackson when he formulated the by-pass
plan and which contemplated the by-passes following the natural troughs of the
various basins.
MR. KENT: At the time this application was being made for permission to reclaim
on the lines of the Central location of the by-pass, was it understood that
these lands on the Eastern side of the by-pass had been purchased and were owned
by the applicants?
MR. ELLIS: No, not at the time the first application for reclamation was asked
for, but on November 19, 1912, the Reclamation Board was advised that a large
acreage of lands on the West side of the Central location of the by-pass, as
well as the lands on the Eastern side of that by-pass had been purchased by Mr.
Armour and his associates, and that an application would be made for a bigger
district to comprise in all about 60,000 acres of land, and on December 10,
1912, Mr. Geo. E. Randle, Engineer for the Gerber-Armour Syndicate, made a
report to them on levee plans for the enlarged District, based on Central
location of by-pass.
I call attention to these matters so that you may know that the Gerber-Armour
interests were investing their money in these lands with the idea that the
Central location of the by-pass would be followed; and while this location has
since been shifted to the Eastern location and some work has been done by them
along this latter line, still, if a decision of the suits now in the Courts
should be to the effect that the Eastern location would have to be abandoned and
the Central location again adopted, then the parties owning these lands would
only be carrying out plans which they originally expected and desired to do.
MR. DOCKWEILER: Is it not a fact, however, Mr. Ellis, that already a very large
amount of levee work has been performed on the Eastern location of the by-pass
idea and that a very expensive pumping plant has been constructed on Sacramento
slough near the southerly end of this district and in the center of what would
have been the Central location of the by-pass, and that if the present adopted
plans should again be changed and the Eastern location abandoned and the Central
location be again adopted, this expensive pumping plant would have to be
abandoned and also, the greater portion of the levee now constructed on the
easterly or Feather River side of District 1500?
MR. ELLIS: Such arguments have been made by those interested, but for a fact the
financial loss would be quite small, as the present pumping plant could be made
use of; also the greater portion of the present partially constructed levees.
Right here I desire to call attention to the fact that this pumping plant was
built at large expense, directly in the middle of what would have been the
Central location of the by-pass and certainly several years prior to the time
when any possible use could have been made of it. One can form his own
conclusions as to their reasons for having done this. This pumping plant and
practically the greater portion of No. 1500's levee system was built, however,
after it was a well known fact that legal proceedings had been and were to be
commenced by the people living northerly of District No. 1500, against the
construction of a by-pass on the Eastern location.
MR. DOCKWEILER: You have just stated that if the Central location for the
by-pass was again adopted, that the pumping plant and also the greater portion
of the present partially constructed levees could be made use of; now how could
this be done?
MR. ELLIS: I have here a small map of that portion of Sutter County showing
District No. 1500 and adjacent sections. I have marked thereon two heavy black
lines showing a location for the Central by-pass, and which location follows
closely the original lines for that by-pass except on its southerly end and
where, for a distance of about 10 miles, there is a gradual shift to the East,
making the extreme mouth of this by-pass about one-half mile easterly of its
original tentative position. This shift is made so that the present constructed
pumping plant could be made use of in the reclaimed area which would lie West of
that Central by-pass location. Of course, with a by-pass in the center it would
make two reclaimed areas in place of one area, as in the case of the Eastern
location. As practically all this land is, however, controlled by one syndicate
they would have their “eggs in two baskets” with the by-pass in the middle in
place of in “one basket” with the Eastern by-pass. In case of a break in the
levees in one of these reclaimed areas it would probably mean that the other
area would be saved from inundation.
MR. DOCKWEILER: You have suggested a possible solution to save the present
pumping plant, but how about the levee work which has been thus far performed on
the line of the Eastern by-pass location?
MR. ELLIS: Every foot of these levees could be made use of except that portion
which has been constructed in what would be the mouth of the location which I
have suggested for the Central location of the by-pass. You will note from the
small map that the Eastern levee of the by-pass on that location would intercept
the present constructed levee (which starts at about Wild Irishman Bend and
extends northeasterly), at about the East side of Section 20, while the easterly
levee of the suggested by-pass location would intercept the present constructed
levee at or near the center of Section 5. Between these two points there would
be about three miles of levee which would have to be abandoned; and I have been
informed that this stretch of levee is now about 15 feet high and with the
natural slopes and crown which are usual with this type of partially constructed
“clam shell” built embankment. The probable cost of constructing this stretch of
levee (construction overhead, etc.) may have been say, 15c per cubic yard. From
this you may form a rough idea of what the cost of this strip of levee might be.
On the northerly side of the District, on the line of the Tisdale By-pass, some
small amount of work was performed across the area which would lie within the
suggested Central by-pass location; but this was insignificant, as this would
lie in the natural trough of the basin, and this is where Sutter County asked
for and obtained an injunction in the Courts against any levee work being done.
As for that portion of the levee commencing at about Section 5 (at the South end
of the Eastern levee of the suggested by-pass), and which follows parallel to
and about 6000 feet distant from Feather River to Nelson Slough, this stretch of
levee would be necessary under either the Central or Eastern locations of the
by-pass; the only difference being, that if the former location had been
adopted, then this levee could have been constructed about 2500 feet nearer the
Feather River and so saved that extra strip for reclamation, and reduced the
unit cost per acre; but all of this present 6000-foot strip of overflow channel
will be available for cultivation for late crops, such as beans, corn, potatoes,
etc., when the entire flood control plan is carried to completion, so that this
land will not be “wasted.”
I understand that all the area in this 6000 width of overflow channel belongs to
the Sutter Basin Company (owners of the greater portion of District No. 1500),
and that the greater portion of this land cost them about $30 per acre. This
land being required for overflow channel by the Flood Control plan, will have to
be acquired by the Reclamation Board; that is, flowage rights will have to be
secured and the Board will, without doubt, be willing to pay the sum of $20 per
acre for such flowage rights. In this connection I might state that the Board
now has an option for flowage rights at this figure for the greater portion of
the land in the Eastern location of the by-pass area (extending from Nelson
Slough to the South levee of District No.1), from the Sutter Basin Company,
provided the by-pass be eventually constructed on that location; and provided
further, that no higher price be voluntarily paid by the Board to other parties
for land in that section, similarly situated, etc.
So much for the levee as far as Nelson Slough. As for the levee from that point
to its present constructed limit at District No. 1, in case the Central location
of the by-pass is adopted as suggested above, then District No. 1500 would have
two ways to finish its East side reclamation. One way would be to cross the
mouth of the Eastern location of the by-pass at Nelson Slough (with a
continuation of the stretch of the levee on the West side of the Feather River),
and connect with the present constructed levee which extends from the Southwest
corner of District No. 803 northerly, following the westerly side of Feather
River, up to and beyond Yuba City. In this case, then the reclamation on the
East side of the Central by-pass would have to depend upon the stability of all
the levees on the Feather River north of Nelson Bend for protection, but would
have no supervision over those levees, and would have to depend upon the general
supervision of the Reclamation Board to see that proper heights, care and
attention were given these levees by the various District Managers. I might
state here, that District No. 1 has been raising and strengthening all of its
Feather River levees to conform with the standard required by the Reclamation
Board.
Assuming that District No. 1500 did complete its plans on this line, then the
present incomplete levee and borrow pit could be used to divert the drainage
waters of Yuba City (sometimes called Gilsizer Slough), to the Feather River by
gravity, through a discharge pipe which could be constructed under the levee;
which, as previously described, would cross at Nelson Slough to connect with the
Southwest corner of District No. 803. Such diversion of drainage could be
accomplished at such times as there were no flood waters in the Feather River
and so save pumping, which would have to be done when the Feather was in flood;
and then the drainage from Yuba City slough would have to flow (as it always has
in the past) into the basin area. In this way the present work of partial levee
construction from Nelson Slough to District No. 1 would not be wasted, if the
Central location of the by-pass be adopted in the near future. On the other
hand, if District No. 1500 should not care to have its safety depend upon the
levee systems of other Districts on the westerly side of Feather River from
Nelson Bend up to and beyond Yuba City, then in that case, the present partially
constructed levee which they have constructed from Nelson Slough to District No.
1 could be completed to its necessary standard dimensions and be extended up to,
and connect with the East levee of the Central by-pass location and through this
levee, at proper locations, drainage pipes could be constructed so that the
drainage from the East would not be interfered with.
MR. DOCKWEILER: In that case then, this drainage from the southerly end of
District No. 1, and in fact up to, and beyond Yuba City, would discharge into
the reclamation area which lies East of the suggested Central location of the
by-pass when the rivers were at flood stages and this would have to be pumped
from that area, would it not?
MR. ELLIS: There would be two ways to handle this drainage: one would be by the
construction of another pumping plant at the Southwest corner of this reclaimed
area and where the drainage would naturally collect, or, this drainage could be
diverted by means of a pipe under and across the by-pass area, and be discharged
into the reclaimed area of the West side of the Central by-pass; and from there,
be diverted southerly to the present pumping plant, which would then be on that
side of the by-pass. I am informed that this pumping plant was designed to have
sufficient capacity to take care of the drainage of the entire area of District
No. 1500, and, if so, then it could care for the drainage of both reclamations
on opposite sides of the Central by-pass. No matter whether the by-pass is
constructed on either the Central or the Eastern location, this drainage will,
at certain seasons, always have to be pumped; but the handling of this drainage
under the Central location will be less complicated and require a less number of
pumping plants than it would if the Eastern location be adopted.
MR. DOCKWEILER: I have here a copy of Flood Control Report No. 22, of the State
Reclamation Board, and on page 4 of this report, it states that there were eight
reasons advanced for fixing the by-pass on the Eastern location. The first
reason advanced is as follows: “First, lessening the length and height of levees
by following the margin of the basin and joining with the Feather River overflow
channel at Nelson Bend; from which point on, one levee takes the place of three
levees instead of making separate channels and running the by-pass through the
entire length of the lowest part of the basin, the bottom of which is more than
10 feet lower than its outlet over Fremont Weir.” What have you to say to that?
MR. ELLIS: There is no doubt but what there is more length of levees in the
Central than in the Eastern location, for the by-pass, as stated in that report.
In planning for flood control, however, a thorough study is, of course,
required, and possibly more than one plan can be advanced for consideration;
then should come into consideration, the question, which of the various plans is
the safest and most likely to successfully meet the test which it some day must
be subject to? The syndicate which now controls the greater portion of the land
in District No. 1500 does not, of course, expect to always hold this immense
area; there is no doubt but what it is their intention to eventually subdivide
and sell off these lands to actual settlers, and when the State approves a plan
for reclamation such as that of District No. 1500, where a large acreage is as
much as 25 feet below the crown of the lowest portion of the levee system, the
lives and property of future innocent investors must be given serious
consideration. In view of the fact that even the Government Engineers admit,
that while the original flood control plan is expected to care for the average
flood which may be expected, it is not designed to care for the flood which may
come every 75 to 100 years; and when that flood arrives (and unfortunately we
never know when it may arrive), the present accepted plan is expected to fail in
part at least. This should also make those who are responsible for approval of
plans for reclamation on behalf of the State give very serious consideration to
the slogan of “Safety First” and not be influenced too largely by the fact that
one plan has less length of levee but at the same time admitted higher water
planes.
MR. DOCKWEILER: The second reason given for change in location of by-pass in
Flood Control report No. 22 was, “lessening the danger from breaks from
saturation of levees caused by water standing at considerable depth for a long
time, as would be the case in the Central location.”
MR. ELLIS: In view of the fact that flood waters in the Sutter Basin rise and
fall quite speedily, this is not as important as it might appear. Again, I would
refer you to page 5, line 23, of the Flood Control report No. 22, which you
have, and you will note the following: “Average depth of water against West
levee of Sutter By-pass on Eastern location will be 18.5 ft. as against 20.0 ft.
on the Central location.” This would be a difference of only 18 inches in favor
of the Eastern location, and which would be inconsiderable as regards
saturation. You will note that either of these two mentioned levees would be the
levees of District No. 1500, whether the Eastern or the Central location of the
by-pass were adopted. If you will refer to the pamphlet which I have given you
and relative to the deposit of silt in the Sutter Basin of recent years (see
page 11), you will note that the disposal of silt is going to be quite a problem
in the flood control plan. In the Eastern location of the by-pass there is not a
single inch of fall in ground level from the mouth of the Tisdale By-pass to
Fremont Weir, a distance of about 20 miles; all the ground level in that entire
area being approximately 30. In the Central location of the by-pass, and between
these same points, almost the entire length is below the 30-foot contour, and
there is a stretch of several miles which does not exceed the 20-foot contour
elevation. Here, then, is a settling basin for the silt to deposit in and all
those engineers who have had any practical experience in that section agree that
with the subsidence of each flood there will be deposit of silt.
The Eastern location of the by-pass has no such similar depression to take care
of for a time at least, of such silt deposit. Assuming that such deposit will
occur in the Central location, it will be but a short time before this
difference in elevation in ground surface, mentioned in Flood Control Report No.
22, would cease to exist.
MR. DOCKWEILER: The third reason given in Flood Control Report is as follows:
“The conservation of lands by placing the by-pass on higher ground which will
drain early enough to secure summer cropping.”
MR. ELLIS: This is a very frank acknowledgment that the by-pass was shifted from
the natural trough of the basin to “higher ground,” thereby raising the flood
plane and violating the basic principle of the flood control plan. The answer to
this reason, however, would be, that for the reasons just advanced regarding
silt deposit, the land in the Central location will probably be equally as high
in a short time as the land is now in the Eastern location. Until this time
arrives, however, the entire area in the Central location of the by-pass can be
cropped to as good advantage as the land in the Eastern location.
MR. KENT: How do you come to that conclusion when you have just stated that the
land in the Central location is, for a considerable distance, about 10 feet
lower than the Eastern location area?
MR. ELLIS: Here is a table taken from Flood Control Report No. 10 giving
elevations of water surface at mouth of Feather River, the data having been
calculated from U.S. Weather Bureau gauge readings at Knight's Landing; (U.S.E.D.
datum with “0” on that gauge being elevation 19.68 U.S.E.D. or 16.08 USGS datum;
the water surface at mouth of Feather River being 4 feet lower than at Knight's
Landing):
YEAR MAY 1ST
JUNE 1ST JULY 1ST
1907
31.4
29.3
26.3
1908
25.8
24.1
19.6
1909
29.9
27.1
23.2
1910
27.5
21.0
17.8
1911
30.6
28.9
24.1
1912
22.5
26.5
17.1
The northerly bank of the Sacramento River, in the line of what would be the
southerly end of the Central location of the by-pass, is practically elevation
30; which means that all this bank is above the water surface of the river, and
the water standing in the basin to the North has, in the past, practically kept
level with the river through its natural drainage channel known as Sacramento
Slough. If the levees on the Central location are constructed on the lines which
I have suggested, then Sacramento Slough would be cut off a short distance from
the present constructed pumping plant by the West levee of the by-pass. Where
this occurs a large and substantial pipe with controlling gates, should be
installed under the levee to permit of drainage of the low portion of the
by-pass area, the borrow pit of the West levee making an excellent drainage
canal to that point. When the surface of the water in the Sacramento River (say
between May and June) is below the natural banks and it is desired to crop the
by-pass area, the pumping plant could then easily and quickly remove all water
in that area and sufficient time be had to permit the ground to dry soon enough
so that it might be cultivated and made ready for late crops, such as beans,
corn, potatoes, etc., the same as is now done on what is the northerly end of
this by-pass.
This area described above as being at about the 20-ft. contour, consists of what
is called in the Government Soil reports “Sacramento clay,” and an overflow each
season in this by-pass, with the resulting deposit of sediment from the
Sacramento River overflow, will greatly increase the value and productiveness of
this area. There is no doubt but what the deposits of silt in this location of
the by-pass will eventually be had by gravity in place of by pumping after the
months of May or June of each year.
MR. DOCKWEILER: The fourth reason given is, that “A more uniform velocity to
prevent destruction of the cultivability of the land by scouring, which we
believe would take place in the upper portion of the Central location and which
would cause a deposit in the lower portion of the by-pass which would
necessitate a raise in the already excessively high levees.”
MR. ELLIS: If “a more uniform velocity” is to be obtained at the expense of a
higher water plane of about three feet at the latitude of Tisdale Weir, thereby
decreasing the efficiency of the discharge of the Tisdale By-pass and also
increasing the dangers in many ways from the added increase in height of the
theoretical water plane, and which Major Cheney, in his report I have given you,
states, is already sufficiently high, then I would prefer a less “uniform
velocity,” particularly in view of the fact that any silt which may come down
from either scour in the by-pass lines above, or still further North from the
river itself, there is a “silting basin” already provided for in the Central
location, while there is none in the Eastern location. Again, this “silting
basin” in the Central location will take care of the silt for several years, and
there will be no necessity for raising the “excessively high levees” (they
average only 18 inches higher than the West levee of the Eastern location, as I
have previously shown you) until such time as this “silting basin” is entirely
filled to the 30-foot contour. If, on the other hand, there should be a silt
deposit the first flood season, of say 6 inches in the Eastern by-pass area,
then, theoretically, the following season these levees would have to be raised 6
inches. At the latitude of Tisdale Weir the levees in the Eastern location of
the by-pass will have to be approximately 3 feet higher than in the Central
location (on account of the higher water plane), so there are unnecessarily
“excessively high” levees in the Eastern location of the by-pass also.
MR. DOCKWEILER: The fifth reason given for change in by-pass location is “the
placing of the by-pass upon poorer quality of soil.”
MR. ELLIS: In my opinion this statement would be correct for that portion of the
Eastern by-pass which lies north of the latitude of Tisdale By-pass, but it is
largely incorrect for the greater portion of the by-pass which lies south of the
latitude of Tisdale By-pass. What would you say to that statement, Mr. Von
Geldern?
MR. VON GELDERN: I think your statement is quite correct. The soil in the
Central location of the by-pass above Tisdale By-pass has several feet of rich
alluvial deposit on it from the overflow from the Sacramento River, and this
deposit never reached as far east as the Eastern location of the by-pass. South
of Tisdale By-pass, however, the situation is practically reversed, the greater
portion of the area in the Central location being “Sacramento clay,” while the
lower portion of the Eastern by-pass and its extension, the Feather River
overflow channel, is silt deposit from the latter river.
MR. DOCKWEILER: How about the cost of construction of the two by-passes, the
sixth reason for the change of location being “less cost of construction?”
MR. ELLIS: The original estimate of the cost of constructing levees by the
Engineers was seven cents per cubic yard for the Central location, and eight and
one-half cents for the Eastern location. My estimate on this work at that time,
for the Eastern location, was 11 cents (see page 7 in pamphlet containing
Argument against change of by-pass location). Mr. George Randle, Engineer for
District No. 1500, has advised me recently that the work which they have been
doing on the Eastern by-pass levee thus far has been costing, including overhead
expenses, 15 cents per cubic yard or more than twice the original estimate. On
the other hand, he has also advised me that the drainage ditch, which they have
about completed in the trough of the basin, and which you inspected on the trip
we took there by automobile today, is costing ten cents per cubic yard, without
any overhead expense. The machine which is doing this latter work is a small
floating steam shovel. Probably a clam shell dredge of large capacity (such as
they are working on the East by-pass levee) would handle this material
considerably cheaper. It might be possible that “shooting” the underlying
hardpan might be necessary, same as they have had to do almost everywhere on the
Eastern by-pass levee, as you saw today; and if so, it would be an added
expense. From what has been accomplished thus far in this work, am disposed to
think that the material could be handled much cheaper and easier on the Central
than on the Eastern location. The original plan of the engineers called for a
levee with 10-foot crown, with slopes of 2 to 1 on land and 3 to 1 on water
side. At my suggestion the slopes were reversed and plans changed to call for
revetment on the water side, on portions of the levee.
MR. DOCKWEILER: What portions?
MR. ELLIS: The Flood Control Engineer found, upon investigation, that when
storms are prevailing and floods occur, the prevailing wind is almost invariably
from the Southeast in that section. He therefore provided, in his amended plans,
that all portions of the East levee of the Eastern location of the by-pass,
which ran parallel with the usual direction of the wind, be not protected with
revetment but that all other portions, where the levee would be “angling” with
the southeasterly winds, same be protected with cobble or or artificial concrete
block construction, or some other suitable protection, to be approved by the
State Reclamation Board. If you will look at page 12 of Flood Control Report No.
22 you will note that this estimate for revetment amounts to $446,978.70 for the
East levee of the East location of the by-pass, and $656,965.06 for all the West
levees, making a total (after adding 10 per cent for engineering and
incidentals) of $1,213,348.14. Now, if the reason given by the engineer for not
reveting those stretches of the levee which run parallel with the direction of
the prevailing winds is a good one, then he should estimate the estimated cost
of revetment on the two levees of the by-pass in the Central location (and
which, on page 17, he estimates will amount to $1,434,858.60), because the
entire length of the Central location of the by-pass is also parallel with the
direction of the prevailing winds and exactly parallel with the section of the
East levee of the East location of the by-pass upon which he proposes to
eliminate revetments. In addition to this, a less unit cost per cubic yard
should be made for constructing the levees of the Central location than in the
Eastern location. With these changes the cost of constructing the Central
location levees will be less and not more than the Eastern location. There are
other items in the estimate which could be questioned but which I could not go
into detail with at this time.
MR. DOCKWEILER: The seventh reason given is that there will be “less seepage,
due to less depth of water pressure.”
MR. ELLIS: I think I have answered this in previous statements wherein I called
attention to the fact that the difference in average height of the levees on
either location, and which would act as levees of District No. 1500, is only 18
inches and that a good portion of this will probably be eliminated when the silt
has filled the low basin area in the Central location. I might, however, call
attention to the fact that the depth of water against the present South levee of
District No. 1 is now about 10 feet; but that if the Eastern location of the
by-pass is adopted, the depth of water against what will then be their South
levee will be about 20 feet.
MR. DOCKWEILER: The eighth and last reason given in Flood Control Report No. 22
for the change in the by-pass is as follows: “Less area flooded in case of break
of East levee of by-pass.”
MR. ELLIS: This depends entirely upon certain conditions which may prevail when
the flood control plan is completed. In case the Eastern location of the by-pass
is completed, if the area between the East levee of that by-pass and the Feather
River should depend upon that levee and the Feather River West levee for
protection, and assuming that the union of these two levees be at the Southwest
corner of District No. 803 (a short distance below Chandler Station), then in
case of a break in the levees on the West bank of the Feather River, say a short
distance below Yuba City, the water would flow to the South and fill this
pocket. Assuming the levees held and that the water would escape in a thin sheet
over the crown of the levee, then the area which would be flooded would depend
upon the height of the levee. Major Cheney's height of flood plane at Nelson
Bend is 45.7; and if the levees should be built there with a height of 5 feet
above this assumed flood plane, then the water would be expected to back up to
the 50.7 contour.
If the Central location of the by-pass was adopted, and if District No. 1500
should make use of its present partially constructed levee which runs parallel
with and 6000 feet distant from the bank of the river, and extend this levee
across the overflow channel at Nelson Slough and connect with the main Feather
River levee which extends up that river, then the southerly end of the pocket
which would be formed would be at the extreme South end of the reclaimed area
which District No. 1500 would have on the East side of the Central by-pass
location. This point would be about one mile North of the S. P. Co.'s trestle at
or near the center of Section 5. The contemplated flood plane there will be very
close to elevation 42 (I have not the California Debris Commission's exact data
at this point with me), and if we should add 5 feet for construction of levee
above this flood plane, then this would bring the top of the levee there to
elevation 47. This would be a difference of 3.7 feet in favor of the Eastern
location as claimed in the report. This, of course, does not take into
consideration the prevailing South winds at flood times, and when they are
sometimes exceeding strong gales; and from actual observation I know that they
have a wonderful effect in pushing water “up hill” in that territory, and the
greater the area covered by water, the greater the effect of the wind; so that
under some conditions this difference of 3.7 might be entirely eliminated and
the 50.7 actually reached under the Central location under these conditions.
This difference just mentioned, of 3.7 feet, would represent the entire general
slope of about two miles in that section; and wind action on water there during
periods of flood, which have occurred there in past years, has actually affected
the scope of flood area to about that extent.
MR. DOCKWEILER: What would be the area flooded by a break in the West levee of
the by-pass, assuming that the Eastern location was followed?
MR. ELLIS: That would depend, of course, upon where the break occurred. If the
break occurred on the southerly end of the by-pass proper, say at about Nelson
Slough, the water would flow southerly into District 1500; and I assume that the
District managers would immediately take steps to cut the levee on the southerly
end of the District so that the water on the land side of the levee would not
get any higher than the water was in the Sacramento River, at say Fremont Weir.
Assuming the water in the river to be at the contemplated water plane of 40
feet, this would mean that (without any wind action) every acre in District 1500
would be flooded except a small narrow strip, approximately one-half mile in
width on an average and extending from about Collins' Eddy to Tisdale Weir on
the Sacramento River side. The wind action would no doubt, however, cause this
strip to be flooded also. If, in place of a break occurring near Nelson Slough,
the break should occur on the extreme South end of the District and so have the
least possible flood height within the District, exactly similar results would
occur as in the first case; the water in the heart of the District being 20 feet
deep. Let us assume, however, that the break in the West levee of the by-pass
should occur at its extreme Northern end; say a mile or two below the Northern
Electric Co.'s bridge crossing the by-pass near the Sutter Buttes; in that case
the water would promptly flood the area westerly to the Sacramento River and
North of Tisdale By-pass, and consisting of Districts No. 70 and No. 1660. When
this pocket was filled (which would no doubt take but a few hours), the water
would, without doubt, break the levee on the East bank of the Sacramento (it is
an unprotected sand levee); this would then gorge the Sacramento River beyond
its capacity (which is only 30,000 sec. feet below the Tisdale Weir); the levees
on the West bank would then undoubtedly fail and the entire Colusa Basin be
inundated. If these breaks should not open quickly and not afford prompt relief
to the river and the District North of Tisdale Weir, then the levee of District
1500 on the bank of the Sacramento would also fail and that District be also
inundated.
MR. DOCKWEILER: How about the Central location of the by-pass?
MR. ELLIS: In case of a break occurring on the extreme northerly end of the West
levee of the by-pass, exactly the same flood conditions would probably occur as
I have last described, except that all that area lying between the East levee of
the Central by-pass and the West levee of the Eastern by-pass (a length of
approximately 20 miles or more), would not be inundated as it would be if the
break occurred on the West levee of the Eastern location of the by-pass at its
northerly end as previously described.
MR. KENT: Have you any further data which you desire to submit?
MR. ELLIS: None, except to impress upon you some figures relative to
contemplated flood planes which are interesting.
MR. KENT: What are they? I want to get all the information I can.
MR. ELLIS: The contemplated flood plane in the Feather River at Nelson Bend,
where the Eastern by-pass will discharge is 45.7
The present ground level in the Eastern by-pass from Nelson Bend up to the
latitude of Tisdale By-pass, is 30.0
The ground level in the Eastern by-pass from the latitude of Tisdale By-pass
gradually raises as you go northerly until it reaches an elevation at the
Northern Electric Co.'s bridge, a short distance below the Sutter Buttes 42.0
(From this latter point northerly the ground raises much more rapidly.)
The present crest of Tisdale Weir on the East bank of the Feather river is 44.25
(It is contemplated that this crest may be raised to 50.)
When storms occur and floods result, the rivers discharge their flood in the
order of their length, etc. The Bear River discharges first and then the Yuba;
then the Feather, and at this same time the American is also discharging; also,
all small streams, such as Honcut Creek, etc., etc. The discharge of all these
rivers and creeks pretty well fills all the channels from Sacramento northerly
to its junction with the Feather River and up the Feather to Marysville and to
Oroville. You will see, therefore, that with the Eastern by-pass constructed,
that this by-pass and also the Tisdale By-pass will be considerably gorged with
back water from the Feather River's flood before any great discharge of water
will begin to escape into the Eastern by-pass from the Sacramento over the
Tisdale and Moulton Weirs.
When this Sacramento River water does commence to discharge into the by-pass
(the contemplated discharge is 220,000 sec. ft.) it will be against a “water
cushion” of a very considerable depth and in a channel way, which, as I have
mentioned before, is “dead level” for about 20 miles; the ground surface at the
latitude of Tisdale Weir being 30 and the crest of the Fremont Weir, where it
will largely discharge, being at altitude 30. Along this level stretch of some
20 miles this flood water is expected to flow safely with surface fall of about
6 inches to the mile, the contemplated flood height at Fremont Weir being
estimated to be elevation 40, while at the mouth of Tisdale By-pass the
contemplated flood height is estimated at 50.5.
Again, I would call your attention to the small capacity of the Sacramento River
below Tisdale Weir. The present capacity is 27,000 sec. ft., and the present
flood control plan contemplates that with the raising of levees its capacity
will be increased to 30,000 sec. ft. Above Tisdale Weir the contemplated
capacity is expected to be 65,000 sec. ft. It will be seen from this that it is
absolutely necessary that 35,000 sec. ft. be discharged over the Tisdale Weir,
through the Tisdale By-pass to the Sutter By-pass. With the Central location of
the by-pass, the contemplated flood plane at the mouth of Tisdale By-pass will
be at elevation 47.8 or 6.2 ft. lower than the contemplated flood plane in the
Sacramento River at Tisdale Weir. In the Eastern by-pass, however (and you will
note that this is further to the East and so reduces the slope per mile), the
contemplated flood plane is expected to be 50.5 or a fall of only 3.5 ft. in the
greater distance.
Now remember that these figures are all estimates, based on certain assumptions.
If the assumption is correct when the figures indicate that 220,000 sec. ft. can
be discharged in the Eastern by-pass location with a perfect ground level for 20
miles and a surface slope of about 6 inches to the mile, then well and good; but
if it should be wrong and this discharge should require a water surface slope of
an additional 2 inches per mile for that distance, then the fall of 3.5 in the
Tisdale By-pass will have disappeared; and if the river is unable to discharge
the necessary 35,000 sec. ft. over the Tisdale Weir, the result will be breaks
on the levees below the weir, probably on both sides of the river, and that will
mean the inundation of all of District No. 1500 and the entire Colusa Basin. It
therefore appears to me that the factor of safety is none too great for a proper
discharge of the Tisdale By-pass into the Central location of the by-pass
without going still further to the East and having the discharge made in the
Eastern location, and at a higher water plane.
MR. DOCKWEILER: The various figures which you have been giving today relative to
estimated flood heights, etc., are they the figures of the California Debris
Commission?
MR. ELLIS: Yes sir. I might state for your information, that the State's Flood
Control Engineer is making calculations for even a greater flood discharge than
has the California Debris Commission and, in consequence, his assumed water
planes are considerably higher than are those of the California Debris
Commission. For example, I have stated that the assumed flood plane of the
California Debris Commission at Nelson Bend on the Feather is 45.7; but the
assumed flood plane for this same place by the Flood Control Engineer, for his
greater assumed flood discharge, is 49.9 or 4.2 higher.
MR. KENT: Have you any other reasons to offer why the Eastern location of the
by-pass is not the proper one?
MR. ELLIS: I am going to voice one more objection, and that is, that the
construction of the by-pass in the Sutter Basin is going to be a direct menace
to the City of Sacramento, which is already in an admittedly dangerous situation
on account of the delay in constructing the Bryte's Bend By-pass, and which will
have no unnecessary margin of safety even after that by-pass is constructed.
MR. DOCKWEILER: Will you please explain how the construction of the Sutter
By-pass will prove to be a menace to the City of Sacramento?
MR. ELLIS: You may possibly be familiar with the history of the results of a
break which occurred on the East bank of the Sacramento River a few years ago,
at a place which is generally known as the “Edwards Break.” When this break
occurred the flood waters backed northerly and menaced the South levee of the
City of Sacramento, and also ran southerly, filling one reclamation District
after another until the flood had inundated practically every levee district on
the East side of the Sacramento River, clear down to and including some of the
reclamation districts in the San Joaquin Delta region. This was one of the most
disastrous breaks which has ever occurred in the valley.
In the Central location of the Sutter By-pass, the discharge will be directly
opposite the Fremont Weir into the Yolo Basin. In the Eastern location of the
by-pass the discharge will be directed at the levees of District No. 1001, which
is the North Reclamation of the American Basin; and the lower end of this
district is below the mouth of the Feather River. If the levee of District No.
1001 should fail, say just below Nelson Bend, the flood waters would rush to the
southerly end of this district, and even if the levees on the river should break
below the mouth of the Feather River, the capacity of the Sacramento River would
be entirely inadequate to take but a very small amount of the flood water which
would be precipitated from above into the District. The result would be, that
the levees of the small canal (which lies between District No. 1001 and District
No. 1000) would be broken and this would then give free outlet for the flood
waters to the South end of the latter District; and from here they would escape
into the rivers at Sacramento City, either over or through the District levees.
This additional discharge, added to what is normally to be expected there, will
be far in excess of the capacity of the Sacramento River below the Southern
Pacific bridge, and then will become a test of strength between the levees on
the East and West side of the river; and unfortunately, the levees of Sacramento
City are lower than the levees on the opposite bank of the river. If Sacramento
City, under these conditions, should fail to stand the test to her levee system
it would then be a repetition of the Edwards break from there on to the San
Joaquin Delta. The whole idea of the Eastern location is, I firmly believe,
radically wrong. With the Central location, the Feather River was expected to
carry a load of 240,000 sec. ft. below Nelson Bend; and it is unfair to that
river to give it an additional load at Nelson Bend of 220,000 sec. ft. to care
for to its mouth. It is also unfair to every district on the East bank of the
Feather and Sacramento Rivers, from Nelson Bend on the Feather River on the
North, to the San Joaquin Delta on the South, to so plan the Sutter By-pass that
it will be a constant menace to that immense and highly developed area, and
which may, at some future time, be made a by-pass by reason of a break in the
West levee of District No. 1001, due to the construction of the Sutter By-pass
on the Eastern location. I do not desire to pose as an alarmist, but I believe
that if the people living on the easterly side of the Sacramento River, from
Sacramento City southerly, realized the possible dangers which they may be
subjected to if the Sutter By-pass is constructed on the Eastern location, and
when future floods occur as they have occurred in past years, such as in 1861-2,
1881, 1904, 1907 and 1909, that there would be many more objectors to the
consummation of this adopted plan than there are at present.
MR. KENT: Have you anything further to offer?
MR. ELLIS: No Sir, I am afraid I have tired your patience too much already.
After the above testimony was given by myself in answers to questions propounded
by Mr. Kent and Mr. Dockweiler, some testimony was asked for and given by Mr.
Edward Von Geldern and Mr. Samuel Gray of Sutter County.
Mr. Kent then brought up the matter of rumors which had been circulated that
improper influences had been indulged in, when the vote had been taken by the
members of the Reclamation Board and when the shift had been made from the
Central to the Western location by the votes of Mr. McClatchy and Mr. Cook, I
opposing the change.
I informed Mr. Kent that I had heard of these rumors, which in my opinion were
both unfortunate and, I firmly believe, absolutely untrue. That Senator Chandler
of Fresno had invited me to his room one day at Sacramento, when the Legislature
was in session and had for about two hours endeavored to “worm” some information
from me on the subject, evidently being under the impression that there was some
truth to these rumors, but that I had assured Senator Chandler that such stories
were absolutely untrue; that it was purely and simply a difference of opinion
between McClatchy, Cook and myself; that they were entitled to their opinions,
the same as I was; that I believed that when these two gentlemen disagreed with
my decision, that it was an honest difference of opinion; that they had not had
the long years of close observation and experience as I had had with flood
conditions, as they had existed in many past years in the area, north of the
mouth of the Feather River and as a result, they were guided very largely by the
reports and recommendations of the State Engineering Department and
unfortunately, none of those engineers, had ever to my knowledge, had any
opportunity to observe actual flood conditions in that area and because of that
fact, did not have “proper respect” for the rivers and their requirements during
times of maximum flood. Again, unfortunately, both Mr. McClatchy and Mr. Cook,
did not seem to realize the difference between the State's interests and the
Federal Government's interest in the project. That when I had left Senator
Chandler, I felt that I had not entirely disabused his mind of this idea which
he had of improper influences.
I then placed on record with Mr. Kent, certain letters written by Major S. A.
Cheney under date of October 2nd, 1912, March 24th, 1913 and March 18th, 1915,
all addressed to me as Secretary of the Reclamation Board; also a copy of a
letter written by Mr. McClatchy, addressed to Major Cheney, under date of March
17th, 1915, all disclosing the fact (which I had always contended), that while
the Federal Engineers had “assented” to the change in the location of the Sutter
By-pass, they did so because the change did not affect the Federal Government's
interest, which was mainly navigation, while the State's interest, was mainly
safe reclamation. That the original plan, drawn up by the Federal Engineers was
for the by-pass in the central location was for good and sufficient reasons, in
which I agreed and that these letters, which I was filing with Mr. Kent
disclosed the fact, that one day, when we were having a rather “warm” argument
as to the proper location of the by-pass, that Major Rand, of the California
Debris Commission had stated that “there were no records in his office that they
were in any way enthusiastic for the Eastern location.” These letters also
disclosed the fact, that Major S. A. Cheney, of the California Debris Commission
had told me in a conversation which I had with him one day in San Francisco,
that “he had from the first been favorably inclined to the central location and
was still so favorably inclined.” That one day, when the Board was holding a
meeting, in the “heat of argument,” I had so quoted Major Cheney; that
apparently Mr. McClatchy questioned the correctness of my statement and had
proceeded (on March 17, 1915) to write Major Cheney (who then was stationed at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), to ascertain whether I had quoted him correctly and
that Major Cheney, under date of March 27th, had replied to Mr. McClatchy,
confirming the statement he had made to me and bringing to Mr. McClatchy's
attention the fact “that the duty and interests of the Reclamation Board were
different from the duty and interests of the California Debris Commission, and
so would require the Board to take cognizance of matters that the Commission did
not”--“The distinction may be briefly expressed by saying that the Commission
was essentially concerned with the preservation of the necessary flood channels
to enable the general plan to be carried out, while it was the duty of the Board
to encourage and further reclamation work, under the general plan”--“In other
words, the primary interest of the Commission was flood control, reclamation
being incidentally permitted; the primary interest of the Board was reclamation,
this to be carried out in accordance with the general plan.”
When Congressman Kent had completed his hearing here, he told me that he was
completely in accord with our side of the controversy. Shortly after, he had all
the testimony, which had been obtained in the hearing, printed in booklet form
and hundreds of them circulated generally and one copy also placed on the desk
of each member of the Legislature.
This booklet, placing new light on the matter to the legislators, Mr. McClatchy
then had the State Control Engineer, Mr. E. A. Bailey, get out a printed
statement, taking the opposite point of view and these were also widely
distributed, with the result, that the majority members of the Legislature were
still further confused and “did not know what it was all about.”
NOTE:
Quite some time afterwards, I received a letter from Congressman Kent, asking me
to meet him at Sacramento, which I did. He then confided to me that he had
decided not to run for Congress again and suggested that I be a candidate for
that office. I told Mr. Kent that I could not do so for two reasons; first, I
was in business and could not neglect that business; second, that necessary
publicity and other expenses, I really could not afford. “Don't let the expense
worry you, Mr. Ellis,” said Mr. Kent, “I will pay all expenses and if necessary
spend $5000 for necessary publicity in newspapers, etc., for you.” As Mr. Kent
was rated a millionaire, this expenditure meant but little to him, however, I
declined with thanks. Mr. Clarence F. Lea then became a candidate and received
the support of Mr. Kent. Mr. Lea has been Congressman ever since from this
District and has made an enviable record.
CHAPTER XCVI
How I Came to Leave the Reclamation Board
IN A PREVIOUS chapter I have explained that the first members were McClatchy,
Cook and myself; McClatchy was President and I was Secretary as well as being a
member; however, when the Board was enlarged to seven members, I was again
Secretary but had an Assistant Secretary, Miss Edith Grove of Sacramento, who
was the active Secretary in keeping the minutes, etc.; in addition, we had an
attorney, also an engineer who had the title of Flood Control Engineer (E. A.
Bailey), connected with the State Engineer's office; we had also a staff of
draughtsmen; all received salaries except the three Board members. Later on,
other areas demanded representation on the Board and the Legislature in 1913
increased the membership to seven, who were also appointed by the Governor.
To comply with the requirements that the interested land owners furnish all
necessary rights of way, etc., it was necessary to divide the whole plan into
projects, and levy what was called “By-pass Assessments.” These were levied
according to the benefits derived, by three additional engineers expert in that
line of work, and after they had completed their work of assessing, public
hearings were held to enable anyone to present protests, which usually they lost
no chance to do. While I believe that these assessments were fairly and
equitably levied, still it was impossible to so convince many land owners and as
a result, the Board was not popular with many people. As the Board met only once
or twice a month, we decided that we should have someone always present in the
office and we looked about for some time to obtain some man, who had a good
engineering knowledge of the plan and a pleasing personality when meeting the
public when they called at the office. It was difficult to find anyone who
combined these qualities until one day I remembered that when the Sacramento
Northern Railroad was being constructed, they had an engineer who appeared very
capable in general engineering; I knew from conversations with him that he had a
good grasp of the flood control problem and as for a “pleasing personality,” he
had “IT.” He was employed with a salary of $5000 per annum, plus expenses and
was given the title of General Manager. After we had announced the appointment,
the following day two prominent citizens in Sacramento asked me how we had
happened to appoint him, and then proceeded to inform me of some questionable
transactions he had indulged in and which of course I had never heard of before;
as I was responsible for his appointment, I felt considerably chagrined, but it
placed me on my guard from then on. He continued with the Board, made himself
useful, was thoroughly competent and filled the position of a “bumper” between
the Board and the public in a very excellent manner and then one day, asked for
a raise of salary to $7,500 per annum and expenses, which was granted him, over
my objections. About that time came the job of clearing large portions of the
Sutter By-pass and Feather River overflow channel; it was war time and lots of
work then was being performed on a “cost plus basis” and that job was started in
that way.
I soon ascertained that our General Manager had purchased a lot of rails,
logging cars and engines from a closed down lumber camp in the mountains, which
had been foreclosed by a Sacramento Bank and, in addition, had paid several
thousand dollars for a switch and spur track, to the railroad company, having
tracks near the scene of operations. At the next meeting, I demanded to know why
such equipment had been purchased, at apparently excessive prices but received
no satisfactory explanation. Later on, he asked permission to purchase two more
engines from the same source for $6000 but his request was refused as he had not
as yet demonstrated any real necessity for the equipment formerly purchased.
Shortly afterwards, I ascertained that he had actually purchased these two
engines and had given a note to a Sacramento Bank for the $6000 and had signed
the note on behalf of the Board. I went to the Bank, demanded to see the note,
was shown it, explained that the General Manager had been told not to purchase
this equipment, that checks had to be signed by either the Secretary or
Assistant Secretary and that I would not sign and had instructed the Assistant
Secretary not to sign any such check and I doubted if the note would be paid.
When the Board had its next meeting, I explained the circumstances, the General
Manager received a rebuke, the bill was not paid and the Bank made no further
demand for payment. It was about this time, the General Manager demanded and
again received, over my objections, another raise of his salary to $10,000 per
annum, plus expenses, as much salary as the Governor received.
Having heard rumors of unnecessary and very expensive work being done on the
by-pass clearing, I made a trip down there one day and ascertained that in place
of clearing only the small trees and underbrush, they were cutting very large
trees, placing the large logs in the river, made up into rafts and from there
they were floated down the river towed by a small launch. I then ascertained in
Sacramento that these logs, when they arrived at Sacramento were delivered to a
small mill which made boxes out of this timber and the owner of the mill was a
son-in-law of the banker who had previously arranged for the sale of the logging
machinery to the by-pass and which had never been used. I shortly afterwards
ascertained various other matters of questionable character in which the General
Manager had been a party, so wrote a letter to the President of the Reclamation
Board, Mr. Fletcher (Mr. McClatchy having resigned from the Board) that at the
next meeting I was going to file written charges against the General Manager.
Evidently some one got very “busy,” for in a few days, I received a letter from
Governor Stephens stating that he had received a letter, signed by “some of the
members” of the Reclamation Board, requesting him to remove me from the Board
because “I was a disturbing element”; the letter requested my resignation. I
immediately wrote the Governor, giving him a detailed statement of the charges
which I had written Mr. Fletcher I was going to present at the next Board
Meeting; that I intended to expose this grafting which had been going on and
that I declined to resign and preferred that he “remove” me, if he saw fit to do
so and which he had the power to do. I received no reply from the Governor but
at our next meeting, a messenger from the Governor called and presented me with
a notice of my “removal” as a Board member. I immediately read to the Board
members, the letter I had first received from the Governor, then my reply, then
my notice of my removal. Only three members of the Board had made the request to
the Governor, and signed the letter, the other members being greatly surprised.
I then presented my written charges to each member of the Board, also one to the
General Manager, stating that I had expected some such action from the Governor,
put on my hat and walked out. I then gave a copy of my charges to the Sacramento
Bee, which published same as having been presented to the Board. I got no libel
suit, however, from the General Manager; he, however, I was later informed, was
given a severe “calling down,” but was not discharged, but the $6000 note at the
Bank was paid. Later on however, he continued to do more improper things and
lost his job; still later on, when a new Governor came on the scene, the whole
Board was removed, but this was largely political as I am certain none of the
Board members were involved in any way with the General Manager's “activities.”
About two years or so later, I had an amusing occurrence. Governor Stephens, who
had removed me, was a friend of Mr. Henry Johnson (our local druggist) and came
up occasionally to visit Johnson, sometimes going duck hunting. One day I
dropped in Johnson's Drug Store to purchase some article and as Johnson was busy
with some customers, I strolled in his back office. Governor Stephens was
sitting there, he did not recognize me; soon Johnson came in and said, “Mr.
Ellis I want to introduce you to Governor Stephens”; we shook hands and then I
said “Governor, it is a pleasure to meet you again, the last time I met you we
had quite a seance.” The Governor said, “I do not understand what you mean Mr.
Ellis”; I replied, “Why the last time I met you, you placed the toe of your boot
to the bosom of my trousers”; the Governor said, “I still do not understand,” to
which I replied, “Why I am the Ellis you kicked off the Reclamation Board.” The
Governor got very red in the face, he started to say that “he did remember
something about it but did not remember all the facts in the case,” etc., etc.,
when I interrupted him by saying, “Now please do not attempt any apologies
Governor, I have no sore spot where your boot landed, I feel quite certain you
were taken advantage of by those three members, and I really would prefer to
still see you in the Governor's office today in place of that 'wild bull in a
china shop' who now holds the office.” The Governor and I have been good friends
ever since.
I really was not averse to leaving the Reclamation Board; for some ten years,
when I had been a member, engineering and construction work were what I was
particularly interested in and always have been; when I left the Board,
construction work had largely ceased temporarily for lack of funds and the
Board's problems were largely legal and financial with figures galore and
“figures” are never particularly interesting unless they are clothed in a female
bathing suit.
CHAPTER XCVII
The Attempted Resurrection of Hydraulic Mining In 1927
AFTER the Judge Sawyer decision in 1884, the miners being very dissatisfied,
conceived a plan for the resumption of hydraulic mining by having the control of
that type of mining placed under the jurisdiction of Government engineers, who
would decide what was necessary for a mine to do in the way of constructing
restraining works to hold back debris in order to obtain a permit to operate by
the hydraulic method. A bill was introduced in Congress by Congressman Caminetti
of Amador County along these lines, desired by the miners, the bill became a law
in 1893 and was generally known as the Caminetti Act. A commission of three
Federal Engineers, known as the California Debris Commission, then took charge.
Anyone desiring to operate by the hydraulic process made application for a
permit and at the same time, filed surveys and plans, showing how much material
was to be dislodged and how and where such debris would be stored. The
California Debris Commission would then have their own engineers check up on
these plans and then advertise a public hearing, at which anyone had the right
to appear in opposition to the permit.
We held a meeting and discussed the attitude we should take and decided that our
policy should be to make no appearances at such hearings and watch and see how
the plan worked out for a while and depend upon the California Debris Commission
doing the right and fair thing to all concerned. We knew full well that the
members of the Commission were disinterested, and could be depended upon to look
out for the Federal Government's interests, which was the navigability of the
rivers and which the Federal Government had finally realized had been seriously
threatened by past unrestricted hydraulic mining. The Government's interests
were also our interests and time demonstrated that we had adopted the correct
policy and since the adoption of the Caminetti Act, up to the present time, a
total of over 1000 permits have been granted and we have never once appeared in
opposition.
These permits have almost all been for minor operations as regulations laid down
by the Commission, for concrete dams and other debris control structures
entailed too much expense for large mines to operate at a profit.
The net result was that hydraulic mining as an industry, was a comparatively
insignificant business and we of the valley considered that the hydraulic mining
problem was a “past issue,” for the following 34 years until 1927, when a
“resurrection” took place when the so called Cloudman Bill was introduced in the
Legislature, proposing an appropriation of $300,000, for purchase of dam sites
and to be followed by the construction of large dams with moneys to be obtained
from State and Federal funds. A few years before, after several years of
investigations and surveys and at a cost of about $1,000,000 a comprehensive
water conservation plan for the entire state had been evolved, and as the
proposed legislation was considered in conflict with that plan and for other
reasons, it was strongly opposed and the attempted legislation defeated.
This was then followed by a series of meetings held by the Commonwealth Club in
San Francisco, when both sides to the controversy were given hearings.
When the Legislature again met in 1929, a similar bill, known as the Seawell
Bill was introduced, to carry an appropriation of $200,000 and this was also
again seriously objected to by the valley interests.
Public interest in both the mountains and the valleys was very intense; joint
sessions of both houses of the Legislature were held and “spellbinders”
representing both sides held forth in an effort to gain votes to their
respective sides. The miners succeeded in their bill before the Assembly and it
then went to the Senate. On May 13th, 1929, I appeared on behalf of the
Sacramento Valley Anti-Debris Association, before the Senate Finance Committee
of the Legislature and made the following argument:
This bill which is before you and which is practically the same as the Cloudman
Bill of two years ago has the distinct disapproval of the California Debris
Commission, of General Jadwin, the Chief of Engineers of the United States Army,
Washington, D. C., the great mass of the people of the Sacramento Valley, and it
is distinctly opposed to and would complicate the co-ordained plan for the
development of the water resources of this State as outlined in Bulletin No. 12
and reported to the Legislature in 1927. Since the defeat of the Cloudman Bill
two years ago I have, on numerous occasions, discussed this proposed legislation
with a great many people living in the old hydraulic mining sections where are
situated such places as La Porte, Gibsonville, Downieville, Camptonville, etc.,
and I speak advisedly when I state that I have yet to find in any of that large
area any interest whatsoever in this proposed legislation simply because of the
fact that the cream of the hydraulic mining area was mined out years ago and
what may be left, the people there know would not be profitable to work. The
only section in the mountains which is showing the slightest interest in this
bill is that on the south fork of the Yuba River where is left the only really
worthwhile restricted area of good gold-bearing gravel, and which area is
largely controlled by a few individuals who are making the sole effort to obtain
this legislation.
After the long series of meetings held by the Commonwealth Club and where both
sides of this controversy were given every opportunity to be heard and present
their arguments, it was very distinctly shown that after taking Mr. Jarman's
(the State's representative) estimate of the anticipated profit from the
proposed hydraulic mining operations and comparing them with the estimates made
by W. W. Waggoner of Nevada City, representing the mining interests, and Otto
Von Geldern, representing the Valley interests, that the average net return
which might be expected under these three estimates was slightly less than 2
3/4c per yard, and the conclusion which any reasonable person could arrive at
was that the proposed mining under the conditions which would be imposed would
be unprofitable and this was the same conclusion arrived at by the United States
Government engineers. This conclusion must be right and is confirmed by the
experience in the past since the year 1893 when the Caminetti Act became a law.
For all those years, under the Caminetti Act, the mining interests could have,
if they so desired, arranged for the construction of dams with the cooperation
of the Government, but no effort was ever so made by them, undoubtedly for the
reason that they did not think that it would prove profitable and they did not
care to risk the investment. Now, they propose to have the State and Federal
Governments assume that risk and invest the money in the dams and if the mines
pay, the State and Federal Governments presumably will be reimbursed for their
outlay; if, however, the mining does not pay, then the State and Federal
Governments would be “holding the bag.” This proposal, the Federal engineers
have emphatically turned down and the State now has the proposal under
consideration and it is now here before you gentlemen for some recommendation.
Referring to the Judge Sawyer decision of 1884, that decision did not say that
hydraulic mining was illegal, but that the dumping of the hydraulic by-products
into the navigable rivers of the State and onto the lands of the Valley was
illegal and had to be stopped. Ever since then, from time to time, efforts have
been made to evade the necessary restrictions, but as yet, without results.
Being dissatisfied with their own Act which was passed by Congress and
previously referred to as the Caminetti Act, the mining interests in 1904
persuaded President Roosevelt to send someone from the United States Geological
Survey Department to investigate and ascertain if there was some other way of
solving their difficulties. President Roosevelt sent out Professor G. K.
Gilbert, who spent three years on his investigations and made a very exhaustive
and complete report, but his conclusion was that there was no other way to
handle the problem. This report disclosed the fact that the amount of deposits
of mining debris between the years 1849 and 1914 in the San Francisco Bay system
amounted to 1,146,000,000 cubic yards, that on the water sheds of the Yuba, Bear
and American rivers only, there had been excavated 857,670,000 cubic yards of
mining material which was eight times more material than was excavated in the
construction of the Panama Canal. In the concluding statements of this report
appears the following: “returning to the excavation of hydraulic mining, I shall
assume that, in the future as now, the work on the auriferous gravel will be
permitted ONLY on the condition that the tailings, both coarse and fine, will be
kept from the rivers, also that the regulations that restrain hydraulic mining
should not be made less stringent,” and further, “with minor exceptions the
gravels that remain in the Sierras cannot be worked properly so long as the cost
of storage is added to the cost of washing.”
In the face of all these reports no further efforts were made to have the
restrictions modified by the mining interests until two years ago, when, as you
know, the Cloudman Bill was introduced into the Legislature. As the report of
Colonel Jackson, concurred in by General Jadwin, Chief of Engineers, should
carry some weight with the State's representatives, I wish to bring to your
attention a few extracts from the report: “The board believes, therefore that
any resumption of hydraulic mining on a large scale should be undertaken only on
such a basis as would justify private investors in assuming all the risks
involved. This would mean that the mine owners should provide direct or
indirectly all necessary debris-retention work.” Again, “In other words, if the
project is successful and mining develops at the rate expected, it will be of no
advantage to the lower rivers so far as preventing the flow of sand into them is
concerned.” Again, “The California Debris Commission is of the opinion that it
is unwise for the United States to enter into partnership with a private company
in a project of this kind.” Again, “Even though present plans may make it appear
feasible to use the site for storage of debris without interference with its
primary purpose of irrigation, this commission feels that the project, of which
this site is an essential unit, IS SO VITAL TO THE WELFARE OF THE STATE AS TO
PRECLUDE IT FROM THIS INVESTIGATION” (this refers to the Narrows Dam near
Smartsville). At these same hearings, it was brought out clearly that while the
mining product, gold, was worth today exactly the same as its value was some
sixty years ago, still the cost of materials, labor, etc., which were necessary
in the operation of these mines, had advanced 67 per cent and that there was no
promise that these mines could be operated at a profit after refunding to the
State and Federal Government their investment for the construction of the
proposed dams.
It is a well-known fact that when the Sawyer decision was made in 1884 when
materials and labor and the expense of getting water was vastly less than they
are today, still many of the mines had ceased to show profits. In an article
published in the Grass Valley Tidings in 1884 after the Sawyer decision had been
announced, statement was made in that article that the North Bloomfield
Hydraulic Mine owed for water $1,700,000 and it was time that they suspended
washing by the hydraulic methods and commenced drifting the paydirt. Also that
the Blue Tent Mine Company were so deeply involved financially that they had to
stop operations and that the California Powder Company was endeavoring to
collect a bill for $70,000 and that there was not a dollar to meet their demand,
and that the mine had recently been sold for $15,000 and purchased by one of the
creditors with the expectation that the Powder Company would pay the purchase
price and take the mine. These mines were largely owned by foreign capitalists
who lost a large amount of money in that investment. In view of these facts, the
only conclusion which can be arrived at is the one that was arrived at by
Colonel Jackson that it would be an unprofitable investment on the part of the
State and Federal Governments to finance dams for the resumption of hydraulic
mining.
Our mining friends have stated on many occasions that the Sawyer decision
resulted in the confiscation of $100,000,000 worth of property in the mining
district; in view of the fact that mining was proving unprofitable even at that
early date, it is rather hard to believe that there was that much loss entailed
to the hydraulic mining interests and no facts have ever been given to
substantiate that figure. Assuming, however, for argument's sake that they did
suffer that much loss, then our mining friends must remember that we in the
valleys also suffered a tremendous loss and in the report of Major U.S. Grant,
3rd, Document No. 23, Sixty-ninth Congress, he states that the “expenditures by
local interests both for flood control and reclamation since 1850 and up to 1925
amounted to $86,645,855.87 and in addition the State of California had advanced
the sum of $4,479,463.76, making a total of $91,125,319.63. As this does not
include expenditures by the United States Government itself and as it does not
include irreparable damage done to large areas of farming lands, it is readily
to be seen that the total expense made necessary in the Valley because of the
operations of hydraulic mining amounted to at least $100,000,000, so that our
losses and expenditures are equal, if they do not exceed, the amount of
confiscation claimed by the hydraulic mining interests.” Morally, I presume that
the Valley interests have a claim for all of these damages which have been
inflicted upon them by the mining interests, but, of course, such a claim is
uncollectable although we are justly entitled to damages.
Under the present Caminetti Act, hydraulic mining interests are now compelled to
restrain their debris and so prevent damage to the property of others and they
irk at those restrictions, but I want to call your attention to the fact that we
in the Valley are also compelled to respect the rights of others even in our
levee building. No levee district in the Sacramento or San Joaquin valleys can
today either construct a new levee or repair an old levee without first making
application before the Reclamation Board for its permission and that Board, in
conjunction with the California Debris Commission, makes its investigations and
ascertains whether such works of improvement are going to be made on safe and
sane lines and in such a manner as will not jeopardize the properties of others.
This is as it should be and we do not complain of these restrictions but welcome
them in the interests of fair play, and our mining friends should do likewise.
We maintain that the future prosperity and the extreme limit of this great
State's development in the future depends upon its future water supply and not
upon its gold product. Hydraulic mining, according to the Jarman report, could
not last, under the most favorable conditions, much over twenty years; on the
other hand, it is vastly more important that the few reservoir sites in the
mountains of the Sierra be retained for the storage of water for the development
of power and for the irrigation of the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys than
it is to have those storage basins filled with mining debris and so lose that
capacity for water storage for all time to come. Even if these dams are
constructed for storage of water, a great deal of that capacity will be
encroached upon by the partial filling of them with mining debris still left in
the canyons; and I want to impress that fact upon this Committee. On page 14 of
Colonel Jackson's report appears the following: “Nearly 620,000,000 cubic yards
remain lodged in the river beds and mine dumps in the mountains and in the large
deposits built up at the points where the mountain streams enter the valley,
while nearly 96,000,000 cubic yards remain in the navigable portions of the
Sacramento and Feather Rivers.”
In conclusion, we believe with the Government engineers, “that any resumption of
hydraulic mining on a large scale should be undertaken only on such a basis as
would justify private investors in assuming all the risks involved.” This would
mean that the mine owners should provide directly or indirectly all necessary
debris-retention work. After the irreparable damage wrought in the State in the
past by hydraulic mining, it is inconceivable that the State would now go into
partnership with this same private industry by investing its money in a plan
which has no promise or guarantee that the capital so invested will ever be
returned; a plan, which also is in many ways in direct conflict with the State's
own proposed plan for the coordination of the water resources of California,
which means vastly more to the great future of the State than any other scheme,
either private or public. We trust your action on this Bill will be along the
same lines as has been that of the Federal Engineers.
There is just one more subject upon which I desire to dwell briefly before I
close, and that is the subject of dams. The Yuba River has, I think, had more
restraining dams built on it during the last fifty years than any other river in
the United States, perhaps the world. The miners, in their early efforts to make
the Courts believe that they were using every effort to restrain debris, built
scores of dams, mostly of logs and some rock filled; of course they all failed
as everyone expected. In addition to these smaller dams, several larger dams
were built, among them the English Dam, a very fine high dam which failed in
June 1883 and precipitated an immense amount of debris into the lower reaches of
the river and the escaping waters flooded a large area of farming lands south of
Marysville, although it was in the summer time and the river was at a low state.
Another dam was the North Bloomfield dam at Humbug Canyon, fifty feet in height
and which soon filled to the top with debris, then more debris escaping over the
top, filled the river bed below the dam until eventually the crest of the dam
disappeared under the fill of debris. Another similar dam was constructed across
Sucker Flat Ravine near Smartsville with similar results.
The State of California in 1880 constructed a dam across the Yuba River, about
two miles in length and about eight miles east of Marysville at a cost of over
$200,000. This dam failed the following winter season. Then the State and
Federal Governments appropriated $800,000 for dams on the Yuba River, the
Federal Engineers expending the money. They first constructed a well built dam
of logs, rock filled, and that dam failed the next winter season. They then
built two very fine concrete dams across the river but in a few years, these
were totally destroyed. Probably over two millions of money was wasted in
building dams on that river. At the present time there is only one real dam on
the Yuba River and that is the Bullards Bar dam, and constructed by a power
company. This dam, from original stream level to maximum high water level is 188
feet in height. Frankly, we haven't supreme confidence in this dam, which cost,
I understand, about $1,250,000. I have had experienced engineers criticize it
severely because it has no “key” at the base, the dam really resting on the
surface of the bed-rock; the dam is only 43 feet thick at the base and only 6
feet thick at its crest. Last year the rock walls on each side of the dam were
so badly eroded that the Government engineers compelled the owners to spend a
huge sum of money in concreting the ends of the dam, from top to bottom and I
understand that more work of a similar character will be done this year. When
this dam was built, it was announced that it was primarily for restraining
hydraulic mining debris and that it was expected to hold forty million yards of
mining debris. It was really intended for a power dam and the forty million
yards of debris will never be deposited behind that dam for the very simple
reason that there are not enough paying mines on that fork of the Yuba River
ever to produce that amount of debris. That is the opinion of many experienced
mining men of that section. The old North Bloomfield Mine, and others like it,
when they were running full blast years ago, perhaps moved more material in one
week than all the present very small mines now operating behind that dam, move
in an entire season.
Now, please do not misunderstand me--we do not claim that dams cannot be built
to restrain debris--we assume that they possibly can, BUT we must remember that
very costly and finely constructed concrete dams in various parts of the country
have failed within the last few years, also a well constructed earth filled dam
recently collapsed, even before it was filled with water, so no one can
absolutely guarantee the stability of any dam; there is always that possibility
of failure. The failure of a dam in the mountains, filled only with water and
causing a possible inundation of some farming lands for a few days, is one
thing; but the failure of a dam, largely filled with debris is a vastly
different proposition. Take the case of the proposed dam at the Narrows near
Smartsville and behind which it is proposed to store 117 million cubic yards of
mining debris from the South and Middle Forks of the Yuba River; if such a dam
should fail and that mass of material be dumped on the top of the 330 million
yards of old mining debris still remaining in the bed of the Yuba River from
Marysville to the foothills, it would result in a catastrophe from which the
valley lands there could never recover, as we must remember that the original
river there was deep and about 600 feet in width, while now, that river there is
three miles in width and the top of the old sand and debris bars is at places,
13 feet higher than the farming lands on the opposite side of the levee. The
evil effect would not be confined to Yuba County, but most of the other counties
to the west and south. Can you blame us for looking askance at such a plan?
Where can the State possibly gain from this proposal to be a partner in the
business of hydraulic mining? On the other hand, does not the State stand to
lose in more ways than one and particularly in the loss of storage of water for
the future needs of the State?
The bill shortly after came before the senate body for final action and the very
interesting occurrences which took place will be given in a subsequent chapter.
CHAPTER XCVIII
Discussions Before the Commonwealth Club
AFTER the defeat of the proposed mining legislation known as the “Cloudman Bill”
in the Legislature in 1927 there were numerous meetings held before the Mines
Committee of that Club in San Francisco and many arguments, pro and con, were
presented by persons qualified to speak intelligently and informatively on the
subject of hydraulic mining. Many persons attended these meetings, among them
being Colonel Thomas H. Jackson, of the California Debris Commission, who
“listened in.”
In connection with the economic aspect of the problem, three opinions by three
different engineers were of great interest, as follows:
1. Mr. Arthur Jarman (who had been employed by the State to investigate the
possibility of rehabilitation of hydraulic mining) had arrived at the conclusion
that on the North, South and Middle forks of the Yuba River, the expected gross
receipts per cubic yard was 10.9 cents while the expenses would be 7.0 cents per
cubic yard, indicating a net return of 3.4 cents per cubic yard, after deducting
.50 for dam payment.
2. Mr. W. W. Waggoner, a long time prominent engineer of Nevada City and
representing the mining interests, made a report indicating expected gross
receipts of 9.81 cents per cubic yard and the same total expense as Mr. Jarman
of 7.0 cents per cubic yard so that Mr. Waggoner's anticipated net returns were
2.81 cents per cubic yard.
3. Mr. Otto Von Geldern of San Francisco, who had taken an active part in the
early day hydraulic mining litigation and who was representing the Valley
interests, placed his estimated gross returns at 10.00 cents per cubic yard and
expenses at 8.05 cents per cubic yard, leaving an estimated net return of 1.95
cents per cubic yard, which however, included a deduction of one-half cent for
dam payment.
The average of all three estimates was 2.72 cents per cubic yard for net
returns. (Please remember that these estimates were on the old price of gold.)
Since then, gold has been advanced to $35; on the other hand, labor and
materials have also advanced; as for necessary water, that is also a debatable
question.
Can hydraulic mining, under the proposed plan and under present conditions, be
made profitable?
CHAPTER XCIX
Final Action on the Seawell Bill
How James Stewart's Victory was Turned into Defeat
THE Seawell Bill came up for final action by the Senate on the evening of May
15, 1929, the day before the Legislature was going to adjourn. Both sides had
been very busy “button-holing” the Senators in an endeavor to win over votes.
The voting on the bill was about 9 o'clock that evening; when the roll call was
completed, we had won by one vote and were vastly pleased that the bill was
defeated; our satisfaction then changed to utter astonishment, when Senator
Frank M. Merriam, (now Governor) who had voted against the bill, got up and
changed his vote, and we then had lost by one vote. The bill then had passed
both houses of the Legislature and would then go to the Governor for some
action. Our side was not only astonished but felt very sore at Senator Merriam;
he had promised to vote against the bill, he had really kept his word, but when
he found that only one vote controlled the final action, he “had a change of
heart,” and as we looked at it, “double-crossed us” and before the evening was
over, I found an opportunity to so express myself.
Later on that same evening, I ran across our chief opponent, James Stewart in
the rotunda of the Capitol; he was in high spirits and very gleeful; he came up
to me and said, “Well Bill, you and I have been fighting about hydraulic mining
for the last forty years and at last I have you licked; now that the Seawell
Bill has been passed, let you and I forget old scores and get our feet under a
table and talk this matter over and agree where we are going to spend this
$200,000 for a dam site.” I replied, “Well, Jim, I don't know yet if we are
licked because neither of us knows what action Governor Young will take, he
might veto the bill and the Legislature is going to adjourn tomorrow night.” Jim
replied, “Now let me tell you Bill, what the Governor will do; he will take his
time to consider the matter for the next thirty days and in the meantime, I'm
telling you now, that I will have delegations wait upon him from various parts
of the State, lots of telegrams will be sent to him, etc., and you just take it
from me, he will not veto that bill.”
Well, that statement from Jim gave me some food for thought, so the next
morning, promptly at 9 o'clock I was at the Governor's office waiting for him to
arrive. He arrived promptly and I asked if I could see him for a few minutes and
he invited me into his private office. I then told the Governor what had
happened the night before, of Senator Merriam's switch in his vote and
particularly what Jim Stewart had told me about the delegations and telegrams
with which the Governor was going to be bombarded.
I then asked the Governor if he would permit me to make some suggestions, to
which he answered, “Go right ahead Mr. Ellis.” I then said, “Governor, we who
have been opposed to this bill, have no idea how you have felt in the matter but
we have been under the impression that you were not favorable to this
legislation; we have done our best to keep it away from you but as a result of
Mr. Merriam's action, the bill is now in your lap and the Legislature adjourns
tonight. Now if you ARE against this legislation, in my opinion there are two
things which you can do; one is to take your time and finally veto the measure,
if that should be your intention, and in the meantime, be harassed with
delegations and telegrams and other influences brought to bear, all of which
will be unpleasant, particularly if you finally veto the bill. The other thing
you can do is to veto the measure at once, this morning; the bill will be
immediately taken up again by the Legislature, an attempt be made to pass the
bill over your veto, which, however, I am positive cannot be done, so the
criticism, if any, because of failure of the bill becoming a law will fall on
the Legislature, possibly more than on yourself.” The Governor said “I am
inclined to act on your last suggestion and wish you would put in writing some
pertinent things which I could use and bring same back to me by 11 o'clock this
morning.”
I immediately went to Frank Jordan's office (Secretary of State) and fortunately
he was in. I said, “Frank I want you to furnish me a stenographer and I am in a
h--of a hurry”; he did so, she typed what I dictated and at 11 o'clock I was
again at the Governor's office, handed him the information he had asked for. He
looked it over and said, “Now take this downstairs to the office of my private
attorney, Mr. Cook, and show this to him and give him answers to any questions
he may ask you.” On my way down to Mr. Cook's office, I met Mr. Adrian McMullen
of Yuba City and the two of us called on Mr. Cook and gave him answers to a few
questions he asked.
About two hours afterwards, just as I had finished having lunch at the Sutter
Club, Mr. Bert B. Meek, who at that time was the State Director of Public Works,
came over to me and whispered in my ear, “Say Bill, I have just read the veto
message you wrote for the Governor; he has just sent it to the Legislature.”
That afternoon, the Legislature attempted to pass the bill over the Governor's
veto, but could not muster enough votes to do so.
Late that afternoon, I ran across Jim Stewart, “and was he mad.” He unbosomed
himself to me for a while, expressing his opinion of the Governor's action in
being so hasty; I told him that he had only himself to blame, that if he had not
told me the night before of the pressure he was going to put on the Governor,
that I would never have thought of going to the Governor the next morning and
making some suggestions to him, which he had followed. Jim said, “Well Bill,
this is not the end, I am going to take this before the people of this State.”
What happened next, will be disclosed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER C
James Stewart's Threatened Referendum
IN THE preceding chapter, I told of the veto of the Seawell Bill by Governor
Young and that James Stewart had told me that he then proposed to take the
matter before the people of the State, at the next general election. At first,
we thought that Jim was just mad and would cool off before long; later on, we
got word from several sources that he really meant what he had said. Well, he
had us scared; we realized that if he went before the people of the State with a
slogan of “Let's get the gold out of them thar hills,” that it would appeal very
likely to the mass of the voters, who had no direct interests at stake and would
very likely be favorably impressed by such a slogan. The hydraulic fight had
been so many years in the past, the old timers had largely passed on, youngsters
had grown up, new people had come to the State, and when people, living right
here in Marysville, came to me and asked just what were the objections to
hydraulic mining anyway, I realized that we would be up against a good stiff lot
of educating and necessary propaganda, if we should win in such a fight and that
it would require a lot of hard work and finances.
We presented the matter to the Boards of Supervisors of Yuba and Sutter Counties
and each county put up $3,000 to the Anti-Debris Association for expenses. We
decided first to disseminate information by having Mr. Adrian McMullen of Yuba
City make a trip to the south, which he did, calling on various newspaper
editors, Chambers of Commerce, etc., in the central and southern parts of the
State. In the meantime, I got to work and compiled a history of the hydraulic
mining history of the past, which consisted of numerous questions and the
answers, all in an effort to make same interesting and attractive enough to
engage the reader's attention and have a favorable influence; we had thousands
of these booklets printed, which were entitled, “JUST WHAT IS HYDRAULIC MINING?”
Mr. Stewart, however, never went through with his plan for a referendum. So that
there may be some records of the contents of this pamphlet, and as it contains a
rather complete history of that long contest between the valley and the
mountains, it is given herewith complete.
QUESTION: JUST WHAT IS HYDRAULIC MINING?
ANSWER: In the famous decision of Judge Lorenzo Sawyer of the United States
Circuit Court, in 1884, he states, “Hydraulic mining, as used in this opinion,
is the process by which a bank of gold-bearing earth and rock is excavated by a
jet of water, discharged through the converging nozzle of a pipe, under great
pressure, the earth and debris being carried away by the same water, through
sluices, and discharged on lower levels into the natural streams and water
courses below. Where the gravel or other material of the bank is cemented, or
where the bank is composed of masses of pipe-clay, it is shattered by blasting
with powder sometimes from fifteen to twenty tons of powder being used at one
blast to break up a bank. In the early periods of hydraulic mining as in 1855,
the water was discharged through a rubber or canvas hose, with nozzles of not
more than an inch in diameter; but later, upon the invention of the 'Little
Giant' and the 'Monitor' machines, the size of the nozzle and the pressure were
largely increased, till now the nozzle is from four to nine inches in diameter,
discharging from 500 to 1,000 inches of water under a pressure of from three to
four or five hundred feet. For example, an eight-inch nozzle at the North
Bloomfield mine discharges 185,000 cubic feet of water in an hour, with a
velocity of 150 feet per second. The excavating power of such a body of water,
discharged with such velocity, is enormous; and, unless the gravel is very heavy
or firmly cemented, it is much in excess of its transporting power.” (18 Fed.
753.)
QUESTION: WHAT QUANTITY OF MATERIAL WAS MOVED IN THIS WAY?
ANSWER: In 1904, at the request of the Hydraulic Mining interests, President
Roosevelt sent out Professor G. K. Gilbert, of the U.S. Geological Survey
Department to investigate and ascertain if there was some other way of solving
the miner's difficulty other than by the Caminetti Act. Professor Gilbert spent
three years on his investigations and made a very complete report but his
conclusion was, there was no other way to handle the problem. This report
disclosed the fact that the amount of deposits of mining debris between the
years 1849 and 1914 in the San Francisco Bay system amounted to 1,146,000,000
cubic yards; that on the water sheds of the Yuba, Bear and American Rivers
alone, there had been excavated 857,670,000 cubic yards of mining material which
was eight times more material than was excavated in the construction of the
Panama Canal.
QUESTION: HOW MUCH MATERIAL IS LEFT IN THE LOWER RIVERS?
ANSWER: According to Major William W. Harts of the California Debris Commission,
“The low water plane of the Yuba River at Marysville was raised 15 feet between
the years 1849 and 1881. Between the years 1881 and 1905 there was an additional
raise of three feet, making a total raise in the low water plane of 18 feet (the
actual fill in the main channel being 26 feet). The depth of fill of mining
debris in the Yuba River averaged from 7 1/2 feet at Marysville to 26 feet at
Daguerre Point and 84 feet at Smartsville. A short distance east from
Marysville, the bed of the Yuba River was 13 feet above the level of the
surrounding farms.” The quantity of material lodged in the river due to mining
has been variously estimated, but it seems safe to say that there are now (1905)
upwards of 333,000,000 cubic yards in the bed of the lower Yuba, this in a
distance of about eight miles above Marysville.” Remember, this was only on the
Yuba River; other rivers such as the Feather, Bear, American, etc., were
similarly affected with mining debris deposits.
QUESTION: IS THERE ANY OF THIS MATERIAL AT THE PRESENT TIME STILL LEFT IN THE
MOUNTAIN CANYONS?
ANSWER: According to Colonel T. H. Jackson of the California Debris Commission,
there are “Nearly 620,000,000 cubic yards remaining lodged in the river beds and
mine dumps in the mountains and in the large deposits built up at the point
where the mountain streams enter the valley.” This material is gradually being
washed down to the navigable rivers and bays.
QUESTION: AT THIS TIME ABOUT HOW MUCH MINING MATERIAL IS THERE IN THE LOWER
RIVERS?
ANSWER: According to Colonel T. H. Jackson, “Nearly 96,000,000 cubic yards
remain in the navigable channels of the Sacramento and Feather Rivers.”
QUESTION: WHAT EFFECT HAS THIS MATERIAL DUMPED IN THE RIVERS HAD ON NAVIGATION?
ANSWER: Before the advent of Hydraulic Mining, tidal effect was felt up the
Feather River to Nicolaus, 19 miles below Marysville, or about 175 miles from
San Francisco by river. The Feather River was navigable to Oroville, about 141
miles from the mouth of the Sacramento River and the Sacramento River itself was
navigable to Red Bluff, about 250 miles from the mouth of that river. Mining
debris, however, ruined navigation on the Feather River many years ago and it is
not being navigated now. The Sacramento River to Colusa is now very difficult at
times to navigate.
QUESTION: NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT YOU STATE THAT NAVIGATION IN THE FEATHER
RIVER HAS BEEN DESTROYED BY HYDRAULIC MINING, AND I UNDERSTAND ALSO THAT THE
SACRAMENTO RIVER HAS BUT LITTLE NAVIGATION ABOVE COLUSA, IS THE MAIN CHANNEL
STILL VALUABLE FOR NAVIGATION?
ANSWER: The Sacramento River has not only been a prime factor in the tremendous
crop production in the Valley, but it is equally valuable as a channel for the
transportation of products. It is said of the Sacramento River that it leads all
streams in the world in its shipment of products grown along its banks. In the
last eight years, the tonnage handled averaged 1,272,534 tons per year, to the
value of $69,576,499 per year and at the same time an average of 85,760
passengers were transported annually. Please understand that to maintain this
navigation is expensive to the Federal Government and on the navigable portion
of the Sacramento River last year, it cost a total of $186,441.78 to dredge out
mining debris bars and various other kind of work to permit this navigation, and
this kind of expense has been going on annually for a long time and will be
necessary for a long time in the future. From this it may be seen that the
Sacramento River is too valuable a river to permit being damaged to any further
extent by the rehabilitation of hydraulic mining behind dams which may or may
not restrain such debris, and 96,000,000 cubic yards of mining debris now in the
navigable river, is more than sufficient to cope with without being added to in
even a minor degree.
QUESTION: ASSUMING THE POSSIBILITIES OF A DAM FAILING, IS THE ELEMENT OF DANGER
GREATER IF THE DAM IS FILLED WITH DEBRIS OR FILLED WITH WATER?
ANSWER: There is always an element of danger to any dam. Engineers will claim
that they can be built so they will not fail, but what guarantee can be given?
We KNOW that in recent years, very finely constructed dams HAVE failed, not only
here in California, but in other parts of the United States and as we in the
Valley see it, there would be vastly more danger if a dam failed which was used
more largely for the storage of debris than for water. For example, assuming
that a dam was built at the “NARROWS” near Smartsville, about 20 miles upstream
on the Yuba from Marysville, and should be restraining water alone; if the dam
should fail, a huge quantity of water would be released which would overflow a
large area, but in a brief time the water would have drained off and the
discharge might result in an improvement in the channels of the river itself. On
the other hand, if that same dam should fail filled largely with mining debris,
that enormous amount of mining debris dumped into the river would undoubtedly
have the effect of filling it up for quite a number of miles and cause the river
to adopt an entirely new channel and results would be not only disastrous, but
almost impossible to correct afterwards.
QUESTION: WHAT EFFECT HAS THE FILLING OF THE RIVERS HAD ON THE VALLEY FARMING
LANDS?
ANSWER: The filling of the river channel resulted in an almost annual overflow
of the farming lands, necessitating the construction of levees by the land
owners at enormous expense.
QUESTION: DID THE STOPPAGE OF HYDRAULIC MINING CAUSE MATERIAL LOSS TO THE
MINERS?
ANSWER: The mining interests have stated on many occasions that the Sawyer
Decision resulted in the confiscation of $100,000,000 worth of property in the
mining districts, but in view of the fact that hydraulic mining was commencing
to prove unprofitable about the time of that decision, it is rather difficult to
believe that there was that much loss entailed to the hydraulic mining interests
and no facts have ever been given to substantiate that figure.
QUESTION: WHAT HAS BEEN THE COST OF LEVEES, ETC., MADE NECESSARY BY HYDRAULIC
MINING?
ANSWER: In the report of Major U.S. Grant, 3rd, Document No. 3, Sixty-ninth
Congress, he states that the “expenditures by local interests both for flood
control and reclamation since 1850 and up to 1925 amounted to $86,645,855.87,
and in addition the State of California had advanced the sum of $4,479,463.76,
making a total of $91,125,319.63.” As this does not include expenditures by the
United States Government itself and as it does not include irreparable damage
done to large areas of farming lands, it is readily to be seen that the total
damage and expense made necessary in the Valley because of the operations of
hydraulic mining amounted to vastly more than the $100,000,000 “confiscation”
claimed by the hydraulic mining interests.
QUESTION: WAS THERE ONLY ONE SUIT TO STOP HYDRAULIC MINING?
ANSWER: No, there were scores of suits with different mines.
QUESTION: WHO STOOD THE EXPENSE OF THESE SUITS?
ANSWER: The early suits were largely financed by voluntary subscription by the
landowners whose lands were affected, and up to the year 1882 there had been
contributed in this way by private subscriptions a little over $65,000 for such
purposes. About that time Yuba and Sutter counties through their Boards of
Supervisors jointly financed these suits and between the years 1882 and 1907
inclusive, the two counties had jointly expended $394,983.62 in this way; then
Sacramento County joined in and took charge of the litigation. Please understand
that this is for legal expense alone. In addition to this, Yuba and Sutter
counties in the meantime, up to 1901, had expended $5,747,329.59 for
construction of levees. Since that time many million dollars additional have
been expended under the State Flood Plan by these two counties.
QUESTION: DO YOU MEAN TO SAY THAT THE BURDEN OF THE EXPENSE FOR LITIGATION TO
STOP HYDRAULIC MINING WAS ALL UPON A FEW COUNTIES AND THAT WHILE THOSE COUNTIES
WERE ENDEAVORING TO SAVE THEMSELVES FROM DESTRUCTION FROM HYDRAULIC MINING, THEY
WERE AT THE SAME TIME PRACTICALLY MAKING THE FIGHT TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTION OF
THE NAVIGABLE RIVERS AND BAYS, AND THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ITSELF HAD NOT,
AND DID NOT, MAKE ANY EFFORT ITSELF TO PROTECT ITS RIVERS AND BAYS?
ANSWER: Yes, I mean just that. Also, that after the U.S. Circuit Court finally
went on record in the Sawyer Decision, even then, those same counties had to
furnish the funds to carry out the Court's decrees.
QUESTION: WERE THERE OTHER EXPENSES NECESSARY BESIDES LEGAL EXPENSES?
ANSWER: Yes, in every suit before it was commenced, it was necessary to get
proper information that mines were operating and doing damage so as to have
proper testimony to prosecute such suits. This information was very difficult to
obtain because the mine owners had armed guards surrounding their mines to ward
off any outsiders who might come near the mines.
QUESTION: WHAT WAS THE REAL DECIDING SUIT IN THIS LEGAL FIGHT?
ANSWER: This was the decision of Judge Lorenzo Sawyer, of the United States
Circuit Court in 1884. The decision was very lengthy, the testimony was
contained in 12,000 pages of printed matter.
QUESTION: DID THIS DECISION STATE THAT HYDRAULIC MINING WAS ILLEGAL?
ANSWER: No; but it did declare that the dumping of the by-products (debris) from
hydraulic mining into the rivers was illegal.
QUESTION: IS THE PRINCIPLE LAID DOWN BY THIS SAWYER DECISION THE LAW OF THE LAND
TODAY?
ANSWER: It is.
QUESTION: DID HYDRAULIC MINING IMMEDIATELY CEASE AFTER THIS DECISION?
ANSWER: No, for the reasons just set forth, that it was difficult to obtain
information to sustain suits against mines because of armed guards surrounding
the mines.
QUESTION: WAS IT NOT ARRANGED LATER ON TO LICENSE HYDRAULIC MINING?
ANSWER: Yes, in 1893 the Caminetti Act was adopted by Congress at the request of
the mining interests and it is still in force at the present time. Under this
act a hydraulic mine was permitted to operate after it had obtained permission
to do so from the California Debris Commission which consisted of three United
States Government Engineers. Before such permission was granted, the mine owner
had to convince this Commission that it would be possible to properly restrain
the mining debris by dams, etc.
QUESTION: DID THIS ACT PROVIDE FOR GOVERNMENT COOPERATION IN BUILDING DAMS FOR
STORAGE OF DEBRIS?
ANSWER: Yes, but this cooperation required a payment of three per cent of the
gross proceeds of mining for storage and no dam was ever constructed under this
provision, or ever asked for by the miners.
QUESTION: ABOUT HOW MANY LICENSES HAVE BEEN GRANTED UNDER THE CAMINETTI ACT
BETWEEN 1893 AND THE PRESENT TIME?
ANSWER: Something like 1000 licenses have been granted and I might state that
the Valley interests have never made a single objection to any permit so
granted, as we had perfect confidence in the fairness and good judgment of the
members of the California Debris Commission, the personnel of which changes
about every 4 years. At the present time, 29 mines are operating under permits.
QUESTION: DID THE CAMINETTI ACT PROVE SATISFACTORY TO THE MINERS AND ACCOMPLISH
WHAT THEY HAD EXPECTED OF IT?
ANSWER: No, the restrictions which were imposed upon the miners irked them and
they became dissatisfied and finally in 1905 President Roosevelt, at the request
of the California Miners' Association, sent out Professor G. K. Gilbert of the
U.S. Geological Survey to investigate conditions both in the mountains and in
the valleys and endeavor to ascertain if there was any possible way to
rehabilitate hydraulic mining. Professor Gilbert put in three years on this work
and made a very voluminous report contained in a book of some 150 pages and
under the head of “THE OUTLOOK FOR HYDRAULIC MINING,” appears the following
significant statement: “The regulations that restrain hydraulic mining should
not be made less stringent unless the advantage from the mining is of greater
moment than the disadvantage to navigation that the change of policy might
entail.” His conclusion was that there did not appear to be any way to solve
this problem other than under the Caminetti Act. Might I not relate a rather
amusing experience that befell Professor Gilbert? When he first came to make his
investigations, he spent considerable time in the Bay area, then he came to the
Valley and I had the pleasure of showing him about here for several weeks the
result of mining and our levee building; he then announced one day that he was
about to investigate the mining section and I suggested that he keep away from
the mines but go direct to the owners and have them show him around. As he
related the matter to me later on, when he left for the mountains, on his way up
he saw a hydraulic mine at some distance from the road and his curiosity getting
the better of him, he tied his horse at one side of the road and proceeded on
foot to get a better view of the mine. When he got quite close, he was suddenly
confronted by a man armed with a shotgun who demanded that Mr. Gilbert depart.
Mr. Gilbert endeavored to explain but without avail and departed and then went
to the mine official's office. Later, when the officials were apprised of the
occurrence, they were profuse with apologies to Mr. Gilbert but the occurrence
apparently made quite an impression on him besides the evident amusement he got
out of it.
QUESTION: WHAT HAPPENED NEXT?
ANSWER: Nothing was done for many years, until the meeting of the Legislature in
1927 when a report was made known as the Jarman Report, which was authorized by
the Legislature of 1925, on the feasibility of the resumption of hydraulic
mining.
QUESTION: WHAT DID THIS REPORT SHOW?
ANSWER: This report (page 33) states that an “Inspection of the more important
gravels in these districts for the present hydraulic mining commission showed
that only 712,000,000 cubic yards could be regarded as workable under the
changed conditions.”
QUESTION: WHAT WAS THE RESULT OF THIS REPORT?
ANSWER: This resulted in a bill being introduced in the Legislature known as the
Cloudman Bill, asking for an appropriation of $300,000 to be expended by the
State in acquiring dam sites with the idea that dams would be eventually
constructed by the State and Federal Governments to restrain hydraulic mining
debris and the State and Federal Governments to be reimbursed by the miners
paying for storage of such debris behind those dams.
QUESTION: DID THIS BILL BECOME A LAW?
ANSWER: No, it was defeated in the Legislature, and two years later a similar
bill for $200,000 was introduced, known as the Seawell Bill and this bill was
passed by the Legislature but vetoed by the Governor.
QUESTION: WHAT WAS THE ATTITUDE OF THE CALIFORNIA DEBRIS COMMISSION IN REGARD TO
THESE BILLS?
ANSWER: When the first bill was introduced in the Legislature, and later
defeated, a series of meetings were held before the mining section of the
Commonwealth Club in San Francisco where both the Valley and the mining
interests were given every facility to present arguments both pro and con and a
great deal of information was disclosed. These meetings were attended by Colonel
Thomas H. Jackson of the California Debris Commission who listened to all the
arguments and later on, at the conclusion of the meetings he made a report to
General Jadwin, Chief of Engineers of the U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. and in
that report were some comments and conclusions which Colonel Jackson arrived at,
as follows:
“The Board believes, therefore, that any resumption of hydraulic mining on a
large scale should be undertaken only on such a basis as would justify private
investors in assuming all the risks involved. This would mean that the mine
owners should provide directly or indirectly all necessary debris-retention
work.
“The Board concludes that the construction of retention dams with Federal funds
to enable a resumption of hydraulic mining is not justified at the present time.
“The debris commission believes that the United States should not enter into
partnership with a private power company for the purchase of storage rights.”
QUESTION: JUST WHAT CONCLUSION HAVE THE VALLEY INTERESTS ARRIVED AT?
ANSWER: We maintain that the future prosperity and the extreme limit of this
great State's development in the future depends upon its future water supply and
not upon its gold product. Hydraulic mining, according to the Jarman report,
could not last, under the most favorable conditions, much over twenty years; on
the other hand it is vastly more important that the few reservoir sites in the
mountains of the Sierra be retained for the storage of water for the development
of power and for irrigation of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys than it is
to have these storage basins filled with mining debris and so lose that capacity
for water storage for all time to come for irrigation and power purposes.
QUESTION: YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT AT THE TIME OF THE DECISION OF JUDGE
SAWYER OF 1884, THAT AT THAT TIME HYDRAULIC MINING WAS NOT PROVING VERY
PROFITABLE. I PRESUME BECAUSE THE RICHER GRAVEL DEPOSITS HAD BEEN PRETTY
THOROUGHLY WORKED OUT BY THAT TIME. IF SUCH IS THE CASE, HOW WOULD THAT
CONDITION BE AFFECTED AT THE PRESENT TIME?
ANSWER: In the hearings before the Commonwealth Club, it was pretty well brought
out that the cost of labor and material necessary for such mining operations is
at least sixty-six and two-thirds per cent greater now than it was in the
unrestricted mining days, and you must remember that the output of the
enterprise (gold) has no higher value now than it had then. It would appear
therefore that it would be quite uneconomical to carry on hydraulic mining now
under conditions which might require more expensive methods to hold back the
debris, than were ever used before.
QUESTION: ABOUT WHAT IS THE AVERAGE GROSS EXPECTED YIELD PER CUBIC YARD NOW IN
HYDRAULIC MINING?
ANSWER: For all practical purposes it has been considered a fair average yield
per cubic yard in the middle and south Yuba mining region is 10 cents. In that
section it has been shown that during the old hydraulic mining days the cost was
$0.0453 for operations; if present advance costs today for labor, material,
etc., are now sixty-six and two-thirds per cent more than the old cost, then
today's cost would be $0.0755 and subtracting the latter figure from the
estimated 10 cent gross, would leave a profit of $0.0245. In other words, if
1,000,000 cubic yards of material were washed away, the net profit would amount
to $24,500 and if we take Jarman's report which contemplated washing of
137,392,000 cubic yards in the middle and south Yuba mining region in 20 years,
this would average 6,869,600 yards a year. If that be done, the average net
profit would be $168,305 and at eight per cent per annum, would represent an
invested capital of $2,103,800.
I might also state that on the Yuba river three estimates were made on probable
net returns, one by Mr. Jarman who got up the report to the State, the other by
Mr. W. W. Waggoner, of Nevada City, representing mining interests and one by O.
Von Geldern, representing Valley interests. Their conclusions were as follows:
Mr. Jarman: Gross receipts .109 less total expense .075 net returns .0340 per
cubic yard.
Mr. Waggoner: Gross receipts .0981 less total expense .07 net return .0281 per
cubic yard.
Mr. Von Geldern: Gross receipts .10 less total expense .0805 net return .0195
per cubic yard.
The average of the three above would be a net return of .0272 per cubic yard
which would not appear very profitable as a mining proposition. Please remember
that this is all on the Yuba River where the most valuable gravels are to be
had. All the other rivers would not expect to show as good results as values in
gravels are less.
QUESTION: ISN'T THERE AN OLD SAYING THAT THERE HAS BEEN JUST AS MUCH MONEY
EXPENDED IN THE MOUNTAINS IN TRYING TO GET THE GOLD OUT AS THERE HAS BEEN
ACTUALLY GOLD RECOVERED?
ANSWER: Yes, there is such a saying and there is undoubtedly a great deal of
truth in it. In any event, gold production is insignificant with agriculture,
for example, the Jarman report estimates in 20 years behind three of the dams
there MAY be produced $10,000,400 in gold; this would be an average of $500,000
per year. Now just compare this with the ANNUAL production of fruits, grapes,
grain and other such products in the two small counties of Yuba and Sutter which
average about $14,000,000 each year and requires vastly more labor than mining.
QUESTION: WERE ANY ESTIMATES MADE ON RESERVOIR CAPACITY FOR STORAGE OF MINING
DEBRIS AND COST OF THE DAMS NECESSARY FOR SAME?
ANSWER: Yes, in Colonel Jackson's report, the reservoir capacity which would be
available behind nine dams on the Yuba, Bear and American Rivers would be
375,700,000 cubic yards of debris and these nine dams would cost about
$12,085,600 and the average units cost for all of them for storage would
therefore be $0.0286 per cubic yard, or practically three cents per cubic yard.
QUESTION: WOULD IT NOT BE VASTLY MORE BENEFICIAL TO THE WHOLE STATE IF IN PLACE
OF HAVING THE STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS BUILD THESE DAMS AND HAVE SOME 375
MILLION CUBIC YDS. OF DEBRIS STORED BEHIND THEM IN SAY THE NEXT 20 YEARS, THAT
THIS STORAGE AREA BE RETAINED FOR THE STORAGE OF WATER FOR THE FUTURE NEEDS OF
THE STATE?
ANSWER: That question “hits the nail right on the head” and brings out our chief
contention that it would be the height of folly for the State to go into
partnership with a private industry, which, if it proved successful would mean
that the State would reap no profit whatever, but on the other hand, would help
in losing reservoir space for the storage of water for the future needs of the
agricultural interests in the State. Colonel Jackson in his report particularly
called attention to this matter in the case of the proposed dam at the Narrows
on the Yuba River and behind which the capacity for storage for debris would be
almost three times greater than the storage of any of the other eight dams; this
dam would be the most expensive, the estimate being $3,524,000 and the storage
was to be 117,000,000 cubic yards of debris; Colonel Jackson stated in
connection with this proposed dam, “even though present plans may appear
feasible to use this site for storage of debris without interference with its
primary purpose of irrigation, this Commission feels that the project of which
the site is an essential unit, is so vital to the welfare of the State as to
preclude it from this investigation.” This meant that it would conflict with the
State's plan for the conservation of water.
QUESTION: WAS THERE NOT SOME PROPOSITION OFFERED BY A POWER COMPANY IN
CONNECTION WITH THIS DAM AT THE NARROWS?
ANSWER: Yes, the Yuba River Power Company made an offer that it would build this
dam and sell outright for $1,500,000 some 350,000,000 cubic yards of storage
space for debris. This dam had been planned as a commercial venture involving a
combined, power, irrigation and debris project and it was contemplated that the
United States Government would furnish one-half the funds to purchase this
storage and the State of California the other half, but Colonel Jackson in his
report stated that “the Debris Commission believes that the United States should
not enter into partnership with a private power company for the purchase of
storage rights.”
QUESTION: IS THE WATER PROBLEM NOW SERIOUS IN SOME PORTIONS OF THIS STATE?
ANSWER: For centuries in the past the melting snows of the Sierra Nevadas filled
the streams that poured into the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys and
underneath the floor of the Valley millions of acre feet of water were stored.
Rapid advances in agriculture made necessary the pumping of water from wells
throughout these valleys and this has resulted in the lowering of that water
table so that at present, in several of the counties of the San Joaquin Valley,
the situation is getting alarming, and in the Sacramento Valley it would appear
that in a few years a similar serious lowering of the water tables will occur.
The first motor driven pump for irrigation was installed in Tulare County in
1901 and there was no water problem then, but records show that during the past
four years, 400 wells have been abandoned in Tulare County and 1500 others have
been deepened and their lifting capacity increased. Practically in 30 years this
great underground reservoir in the San Joaquin has been largely dissipated and
today the question is, whether or not surplus flood waters of the Sacramento
River and its tributaries, now flowing into the ocean, can be diverted in the
San Joaquin Valley to care for their increasing needs. According to Bulletin No.
12, Water Resources of California, compiled by the Department of Public Works,
if all the water resources of the San Joaquin Valley were used, there “is little
more than half enough water for its future needs.” It would appear that before
long, a very similar situation will prevail in the Sacramento Valley and that is
why we seriously object to the construction of dams in the Sierras to hold
mining debris in place of keeping that storage of water for future needs.
QUESTION: WELL, THIS HAS ALL BEEN VERY INTERESTING AND INSTRUCTIVE. WE DO NOT
KNOW OF ANY MORE QUESTIONS TO ASK. HAVE YOU ANYTHING TO SUGGEST?
ANSWER: Yes, I would suggest that you consider all of these matters very
carefully and seriously and that when you vote on this question next November,
that you will come to the same conclusion that the Federal Government's
Engineers have arrived at, that it would be unwise to enter into partnership
with a private industry and that the State of California should not do so
either. Also that you conclude that it is tremendously important to retain all
possible storage basins for the storage of water for future development and
needs of the State and that it would be the height of folly to sacrifice a large
portion of that storage area for the storage of vast quantities of mining debris
for the momentary gain of a few million dollars of gold in the next twenty
years.